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Chapter 1.
Introduction
Good decision-making requires good communication. In organizations, it is typical that relevant
information is dispersed for decision-making (Hayek (1945)). While eective communication is
necessary to make informed decisions, there may exist various constraints that make communication
costly and incomplete. It is crucial to take these constraints into account when we discuss about
what an organization should be from the perspective of eciency. The rst attempt to understand
decision-making under dispersed information in organizations began with studies of a model under
exogenous communication quality. Marschak and Radner (1972) construct the team theoretic
model, in which decisions are needed to be coordinated but communication is costly due to physical
reasons. Building on their work, Cremer (1980) and Dessein and Santos (2006) discuss how multiple
tasks are bundled from the perspective of reducing coordination loss led by limited communication,
and Aoki (1986) compares the eciency of vertical and horizontal information structures.
However, we know little about decision-making under strategic situations in which constraints
can arise endogenously, in particular, in situations where people strategically transmit information
in organizations. Recent studies of organizational economics teach us that consideration of endoge-
nous communication quality involves many signicant implications for designing an organization. A
trade-o between eort provision and informative communication is a good example for clarifying
this aspect clear; optimal contracts from the perspective of eliciting eort often create conict be-
tween agents over decisions made in organizations, and serious conict generally lowers the amount
of information provided by agents, as shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982). To understand this,
let's consider a situation in which an organization introduces a comparative measure in evaluating
agents' performance. While comparative performance evaluation can enhance agents' incentives
for providing eort by mitigating the free-rider problem or eliminating the common measurement
error in performance evaluation (Holmstr}om(1982)), it makes agents act in their personal interest,
rather than in the interest of the organization. For example, agents are inclined to disagree with
implementing projects that may cause their own performance to decline but improves the other
agents' performance, despite the fact that the project yields a large benet for the entire orga-
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nization.1 Then, even if agents become aware of such a benecial project, they have incentives
to conceal or misrepresent it to manipulate the organizational decision for their personal interest,
thereby making a wrong decision in organizations. Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2010) study
the trade-o between eort provision and high quality of communication in the synergy-creation
problem, and Friebel and Raith (2010) discuss the boundary of the rm from the perspective of
this tradeo.
A few researches study the issue of authority allocation in organization under strategic com-
munication. Dessein (2002) studies the value of delegation in the traditional cheap talk model
presented in Crawford and Sobel(1982). He shows that higher organizational performance can
be achieved when the person ("sender" in the terminology of cheap talk) who possesses complete
knowledge regarding an underlying state, but whose objective is biased makes a decision, than when
the person ("receiver" in the terminology of cheap talk) who possess no information regarding the
state but whose objective is not biased makes a decision, if communication is strategic. Simi-
larly, building on the team theoretic model, Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari
(2008) study the optimal authority allocation in a multi-agents(senders) situation: centralization or
decentralization. However, many issues regarding decision-making in organization under strategic
communication still remain to be explored.2
The main purpose of this thesis is to study decision-making with endogenous communication
quality by investigating how eective leadership improve the quality of decision-making under
strategic communication. Specically, we develop the model of strategic information transmission
and answer the following questions: (i) how does a leader's belief regarding the value of her own
and/or followers' information aect the amount of information provided from followers through
cheap talk, and (ii) when should a leader adopt communication-based decision-making process
under strategic-communication constraints?
In Chapter 2, we answer the rst question of the relation between a leader's belief on the value
of leader's and/or followers' information and quality of communication. We construct a primitive
strategic information transmission game between one leader (receiver) and two followers (senders).
In this game, the followers have independent and heterogeneous preferences with regard to the
1Athey and Roberts (2001) study this fundamental trade-o between eort provision and creating conict under
comparative performance evaluation.
2As an approach to model endogenous communication quality in organization other than cheap talk, Gibbons
(2005) develops the model of signal jamming.
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organizational decision, but this is private information. The leader listens to the followers regarding
their preferences through cheap talk and makes an organizational decision to maximize overall
welfare. Contrary to prevailing knowledge, we show that the leader who overestimates the value
of her own information (or underestimates the value of followers' information) can extract more
precise information from followers as compared to leaders who rationally estimate or underestimate
such information (or overestimate the value of followers' information), if followers are likely to have
a signicantly dierent preference.
The results of Chapter 2 also involve a theoretical contribution to the literature of studies on a
receiver's sensitivity in strategic information transmission. Early studies in the literature focus on
the situations in which one sender who has an irrational belief on the value of his own information
communicates with one receiver. Admati and Peiderer (2004) argue that a sender's overcondence
in his skill of observing an underlying state may improve the quality of communication and the
receiver's welfare. Kawamura (2013) also shows that a slight overcondence on the part of the sender
can always increase information transmission and the receiver's welfare whenever the sender has a
dierent preference from the receiver's decision, whereas undercondence does not. This study oers
a novel theoretical insight regarding how a receiver's condence on two senders' information aects
information transmission, depending on the level of conict between two senders. We nd that the
amount of information provided by one sender depends on two factors: the receiver's sensitivity
to that sender's opinion in making a decision and the collective opinion, which is formed as the
expected sum of the opinions of the receiver and the other sender weighted by the sensitivity to
each opinion. We show that a sensitive receiver can improves the senders' information transmission
through the rst factor if the conict between the two senders is not severe but can decline it
through the second factor otherwise.
In Chapter 3, we construct a team theoretic model and answer the second question of decision-
making process under strategic-communication constraints. In the model, each follower's perfor-
mance is maximized when his decision is adapted to each environment and is coordinated with
the organizational decision. Each environment is private information for each follower. The leader
makes an organizational decision to maximize the organizational performance, which is dened as
the sum of both followers' performance. We compare two decision-making processes in the chap-
ter. In one process, which is associated with the leader's initiative, the leader collects information
on each environment through cheap talk from the followers and makes an organizational decision,
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before the followers make decisions. In another process, the leader postpones her decision until
the followers make their decisions, observes the followers' decisions, and thereafter makes an or-
ganizational decision. We show that the former process has an advantages over the latter process
when the importance of coordination is relatively greater than the importance of adaptation, and
the opposite is true otherwise. We also discuss that one strong point of communication-based
decision-making lies in aligning followers' decisions with the interest of the organization.
A few empirical studies on leadership indicate that leadership style has a considerable eect
on the decisions of the organizations (Bertrand and Schoar (2003)) and which traits of the leader
are positively or negatively related the organizational success (Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen
(2012)).3 Although the early studies on leadership by economists focus on the role of leadership in
eliciting eorts from followers (Hermalin (1998), Rotemberg and Saloner (1993, 2000)), researchers
recently investigate the role of leadership in coordinating followers decisions under communication
limited due to exogenous reasons by developing team theoretical models. Brunnermeier, Bolton,
and Veldkamp (2013) emphasize the value of a leader's resoluteness in her decision-making for
achieving better coordination in the team when direct communication is impossible. Dewan and
Myatt (2008) study the situation in which only leaders have information, and they emphasize the
value of the leader's speaking skills in communication, rather than the skill in accurately observing
the environment. The role of leadership in decision-making under endogenous communication
quality, however, remains to be explored in the literature, and we provide signicant attempts to
understand it in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis.
In chapter 4, we consider a task assignment problem from the perspective of behavioral eco-
nomics.4 Task allocation is one of central issues in the literature on communication and organiza-
tions. In real organizations, the prevalent practice is that a single task is always assigned to a single
agent, even if the other agents can potentially implement the task in a better manner in certain
situations. Although studies in communication-and-organization literature explain why multiple
tasks are assigned to a single agent from the perspective of mitigating coordination failure caused
by costly communication ( Cremer (1980) and Dessein and Santos (2006) ), it can not explain why
such a simple form of assignment prevails. In Chapter 4, we attempt to understand this issue from
3In management literature, researchers believe that the value of a leader's traits or behaviors is determined by the
underlying situation or environment (for example, Fiedler(1967) and Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009)).
4Chapter 4 is a joint work with Kohei Daido, Kimiyuki Morita, and Takeshi Murooka. My contribution is
constructing the theoretical model and deriving the propositions.
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a prominent behavioral aspect: expectation-based loss aversion developed by K}oszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007). We analyze the simple task-assignment model, in which a principal assigns a task to
one of two agents depending on future states and the productivity of one agent is higher than the
others in a state but lower in another state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, assigning the
task to a single agent in all states can be optimal, even when the principal can write a contingent
contract at no cost.
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Chapter 2.
A Good Lister and a Bad Listener
1 Introduction
"Listening is the rst priority for managers." - Konosuke Matsushita (Founder of
Panasonic)
"Don't let the noise of others' opinions drown out your own inner voice."
- Steve Jobs (CEO of Apple)
It is critical that a leader listens to the opinions of her followers in making decisions. However,
it is often challenging to elicit full information from them, because self-interested followers may
have an incentive to provide misleading information to inuence the leader's decision in favor of
themselves. For example, suppose the CEO of a rm needs to design a new product. Whereas
the CEO may have in mind an ideal design that is optimal from the perspective of cost saving
because of the production technology of the rm, she may have less information about the needs
of consumers in each local market. Because sales managers in local markets know the needs better
than the CEO, their opinions help to identify the product that will maximize total sales in a whole
market. However, if the sales managers prefer the product that would be sold mostly in their own
markets, they may exaggerate the needs in their respective markets (e.g., "our consumers need a
more functional product") even if the extent of the needs is not so extreme, because manager know
that the CEO will consider their opinions as well as those of the other managers, who may send
conicting messages to the CEO. In such a situation, it is important for the leader to be able to
elicit as much information as possible.
Although excellence in listening is considered as a key factor in ecient leadership, we know
little about what type of leaders can actually elicit a large amount of information. In this paper,
our main focus is on leaders' sensitivity toward others' opinions in listening. Specically, we focus
on two types of leaders: a good listener and a bad listener. An example of the rst type is Konosuke
Matsushita, the founder of Panasonic; he incorporates followers' opinions into own decision giving
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them a lot of weight, and does not persist in his own opinion. We call a Matsushita-like leader a
good listener, because such a leader gives more importance on followers' opinions and is intensely
interested in listening to them. An example of the second type of leader is Steve Jobs, the former
charismatic CEO of Apple, who tended to persist in his own opinion rather than incorporate the
opinions of others. We call a Jobs-like leader a bad listener, because such a leader tends not to listen
and learn from other people. These observations lead us to the questions we attempt to answer in
this paper. How does leaders' sensitivity aect the amount of information followers provide? Which
type of leaders able to elicit more information from followers? How should leaders communicate
their opinions with followers in order to elicit plenty of information?
Here, we construct a model of a strategic information-transmission game between a leader and
two followers. The followers may have dierent preferences concerning organizational decisions, and
these are private information. The leader makes an organizational decision to maximize organiza-
tional welfare, but the followers are assumed to be self-interested. The leader and the followers can
communicate what decision they prefer via cheap talk before the decision is made. Even truthful
communication is not strategy proof because the leader do not incorporate each follower's opinion
fully into the decision. Only partially informative communication can be achieved as Crawford and
Sobel (1982), which partitions the type space into some intervals so that the follower reveals only
that the information belong to a certain interval; thus, the followers' messages contain some noise
in the equilibrium.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, a leader's sensitivity may hurt the quality of communication with
the followers. It is true that if there is only one follower, a good listener can elicit more information
than a bad listener. If a leader is a good listener, a follower will be more willing to reveal information
because such a leader does not persist in her opinion, rather carefully considering and incorporating
followers' opinions. However, if there is even one more follower, the negative side of being a good
listener arises. Because a good listener is also sensitive to other followers' opinions, the leader's
decision may also be easily inuenced by their opinions. If followers believe that their rivals hold
opposite opinions from them, they may exaggerate their information in order to change the leader's
mind.
More precisely, when followers communicate their opinions with the leader, they take two factors
into accounts: rst, how will the leader incorporate their opinions into the decision? If the leader
gives followers' opinions substantial weight, the incentive to misrepresent information becomes
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weak, and followers are inclined to provide more information. Second, what is the collective opinion
in the organization (which is formed as the expected weighted sum of the opinions of the leader
and the other followers)? If a given follower believes that the other organizational members have
similar opinions, that follower does not feel the need to misrepresent information. Conversely,
if the follower believes that others have dierent opinions and that the collective opinion diers
from his ideal decision, there is a larger incentive to exaggerate information to change the leader's
mind. Such a conict of opinions over organizational decisions results in the follower's providing
less information. Thus, a sensitive attitude of a leader may exacerbate misrepresentation from the
followers when their opinions are likely to be in conict.
A distortion in leaders' sensitivity toward followers' opinions may actually improve an organi-
zational performance. If a distortion in leaders' decision policies from the ex-post ecient level
is slight, we can neglect all direct eect from the distortion, and only the strategic eect matters
as it captures how the distortion aects the quality of communication with the followers. There-
fore, a slight increase or decrease in leaders' sensitivity can improve the organizational performance
whenever it facilitates communication.
In the discussion section, we address two issues. The rst concerns the value of being a good
listener when there is some biases in the side of the leader. We show that the value of being a
good listener is more likely to be high when leaders have biased opinions. This is likely because
leaders' extreme opinions give followers an incentive to exaggerate their information; in such a
scenario, leaders can elicit more information by giving up their own extreme opinions. Another
form of distortion in sensitivity is leader favoritism, in which leaders show dierent sensitivities
toward each follower. We demonstrate that it is preferable for organizations to employ the leader
who is biased in terms of showing high sensitivity toward the follower whose information is most
volatile.
The second issue relates to leaders' condence in their communication skill. We also show that
irrational self-condence in the leader's own communication skill can explain a distortion in the
leader sensitivity. We argue that leaders who are overcondent in their communication skills and
irrationally underestimate the probability of communication failure incorporate followers' opinions
more into organizational decisions, whereas an undercondent leader, who irrationally overestimates
the probability of failure, incorporates them less.
We further examine a bilateral communication setting, in which a leader can send a one-time
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costless message to the followers concerning her opinion before the followers send messages. We nd
that leader's equilibrium strategy can take only two forms; binary strategy and babbling strategy
despite the leader's type space being a continuum and more than three messages available. Although
there may be an innite number of binary equilibrium, all equilibrium can be Pareto ranked, and
the amount of information provided from the followers and the organizational performance is better
in babbling equilibrium than in any binary equilibrium. The results imply that a leader should
intentionally obfuscate her own opinion before she listens to followers.
2 Related Literature
Leadership
To our knowledge, no theoretical model has been constructed to discuss what a type of leaders
improves the quality of communication itself in a strategic communication setting. Some papers
on leadership have studied the role of leaders in eliciting followers' eorts. Rotemberg and Saloner
(1993, 2000) considered the situation in which a follower exerts eort in nding improvements and
the leader decides whether to adopt the follower's idea or not. They show that if the leader is open
to a follower's suggestion for improvement, the followers' eorts are enhanced. Hermalin (1998)
considers the free-rider problem in a team, and he shows that a leader can moderate the problem
with leading by example. However, the researchers do not address the aspect of the quality of
communication.
Some researchers have studied the role of leadership and non-strategic communication in coordi-
nation games. Although our model does not address coordination issues, the messages in this paper
are similar to those from Brunnermeier et.al (2012), who emphasize the value of leader resoluteness
in listening to followers in a coordination game. They argue that leader resoluteness helps to mit-
igate coordination diculty, which arises from a time-consistency problem. Our work diers from
theirs in two senses, though we emphasize similar traits. First, they do not allow communication
among organizational members in terms of private information before decision-making. Second,
even if communication is possible, there is no reason to provoke intentional communication noise
because there is no ex-post conict among organizational members in their model. Dewan and
Myatt (2008) also depict a situation in which followers' actions need to be adapted to the environ-
ment and coordinated to the other followers' actions. Only leaders can observe signals concerning
the environment and can transmit the signals to the followers. They emphasize the importance
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of not only skillful observation but also speaking skills in ecient coordination. A novel contri-
bution of our paper is to point out that communication diculty arises from ex-post conict if
communication is possible and that leadership may help to mitigate such a diculty.
Researchers have also examined leader overcondence in the literature. Gervais and Goldstein
(2007), Van Den Steen (2005), Vidal and Mollar (2007), and Brunnermeier et.al (2012) emphasize
the positive sides of a leader's overcondence, and Goel and Thakor (2008) address why a leader
might be overcondent. Our work points out not only the positive side of leader overcondence,
but also the negative side that may exist in terms of eciency in communication. Furthermore,
little research has considered leaders' irrational condence in communication skills.
As considered in the management literature, dierent attitudes in listening to followers are
interpreted as arising from dierences in leaders' traits, such as openness. It is plausible that if
leaders have a high degree of openness, they tend to listen to others and to incorporates others'
opinions exibly into their decisions. In the management literature, some studies support this view.
Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella (2009) denote CEOs openness as a composite of such facets of
her personality as awareness of multiple perspectives, valuing discourse and debate, and openness
to new ideas. Using quantitative coding of the biographies of CEOs, Peterson et.al.(2003) also
argue that a leader with high openness shows high exiblity in decision-making. Researchers in the
contingency school -for example, Fiedler(1967)- also believe that the value of a leader's traits or
behaviors is determined by the underlying situation or environment. Our study contributes to an
understanding of how the value of leader openness varies by situations in a strategic communication
setting.
A few economists have done empirical studies on leadership. Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
nd empirical evidence that a CEO has a considerable eect on the decisions of a rm. Kaplan,
Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) did the rst empirical study by economists on the relation between
a leader's traits and organizational success. The implication of this paper is consistent with the
part of their ndings showing that the interpersonal aspects of a leader become less important and
the execution aspect becomes more important as a rm matures, at which time the organizational
members are more likely to become in conict.
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Cheap talk
This paper has some contributions to the literature on cheap talk. Using the terminology in
the literature, this paper considers the situation in which multiple senders exist and they have
independent preferences on the receiver's decision. Crawford and Sobel(1982) is a seminal work
in this eld. They consider the situation in which only a sender can observe the true state, but
only a receiver can make a decision that aects both utilities. They show that there is a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium such that state spaces are divided by nite numbers of partitions, and the
sender reveals only the partition in which the true state is as long as the parties never have the same
preference in the decision. Some researchers examine multi-sender situations, where senders have
correlated preference on a receiver's decision, for example, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987), Krishna
and Morgan (2001), and Battaglini (2002).
Some researchers have studied a multi-sender situation in which senders have independent pref-
erences on the receiver's decision. The closest model is the individually biased-agents case studied
in Kawamura (2011), who considers a problem in which a decision maker gathers information via
cheap talk about members' preferences on a level of public goods provision that aects all members'
welfare. Austen-Smith (1993) makes the comparison between simultaneous and sequential reporting
when senders have independent preference. The problem under the centralization case, as treated
by Alonso, Dessein, and Matoushek (2008) and Rantakari (2008, 2013), is also close to the one in
our model. This paper diers from theirs in the sense that our model studies how heterogeneity
in the distributions of senders' preferences aects the quality of communication as well as what
a type of distortions in the receiver's decision policy help to elicit information. Furthermore, our
paper also investigate a situation in which a receiver (the leader in this paper) also have private
information and can communicate it.
The situation this paper considers is similar to that examined by Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner
(2005). In their model, the CEO listens to managers, whether they are implementing a suggested
project or choosing a status quo. They show that in the condition of a high-powered incentive
contact, managers will exaggerate the merit (resp. a demerit) of the quality of a suggested project
when it brings a positive (resp. negative) return to their own divisions but a negative return to
other divisions. Although our paper neglects the possibility of designing incentive contracts for
followers, we thoroughly investigate the issue as it relates to communication and leadership.
Some researchers study how the players' self-condence on the precision of the sender's sig-
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nal aect the quality of communication and welfare in one-receiver and one-sender information
transmission games. Admati and Peiderer (2004) argue that the sender's overcondence in his
observing skill may improve the quality of communication and the receiver's welfare. Kawamura
(2013) also shows that a slight overcondence on the part of the sender can always increase infor-
mation transmission and the receiver's welfare whenever the sender has a dierent preference from
the receiver's decision, whereas undercondence does not. We derive the clear welfare result that
the value of overcondence on the receiver's side is likely to be negative as conict on the receiver's
decision among senders becomes severe in a multi-sender setting.
The analysis in the bilateral communication setting contributes to the issue concerning whether
disclosing conict before communication is benecial or not. Li and Madarasz (2008) consider the
information transmission game and show that mandatory disclosure about the extent of conict
between the sender and the receiver is not benecial. While this paper shares a similar result to
them in the sense that revealing information about dierences in preferences among the players
before communication hurts the quality of communication, no informative message is transmitted
via cheap talk in their model, whereas informative communication is feasible even via cheap talk
in the model presented here.
3 Model
We consider an organization in which there is one leader (she) and two followers (he) indexed by
i = 1; 2. The leader and the followers have their preferences concerning an organizational decision.
Specically, we assume that follower i's prot is given by
i =  (d  i   bi)2;
where d 2 R is an organizational decision (e.g., product design), and i + bi is follower i's ideal
decision (e.g., the consumers' needs in the local market managed by manager i). i is follower i's
private information and is uniformly distributed in [ si; si] where si 2 R+, and bi 2 R is public
information. We assume  b1 = b2 = b > 0, that is, the expected followers' ideal decision is symmet-
rical around zero. Then, b represents the extent of ex-ante conict concerning the organizational
decisions between the followers. Each follower's objective is to maximize only his own prot.1
1In organizations, it is typically to undesirable to fully align a member's incentives from the viewpoint of preventing
a free-rider problem, even if a misalignment in their incentives creates communication diculty. Athey and Roberts
(2001), Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2010), and Friebel and Raith (2010) address this issue.
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We assume that organizational performance is given by
 =  L(d  L)2  
X
i=1;2
i(d  i   bi)2:
L is what the leader considers as the ideal decision (e.g., the production technology of the rm),
and it is her private information. L follows a density function fL and a cumulative function FL,
and let the mean and the variance be L and 
2
L respectively. L represents the importance of the
leader's information on the organizational performance (e.g., the importance of cost saving), and
i represents the importance of follower i's information on the organizational performance (e.g.,
the importance of success in each local market).
Our key assumption is that the leader has an irrational belief in the value of L. The leader
believes the importance of her own information to be higher or lower than L. The leader's belief
is denoted as L. We assume that the leader decides d to maximize
 =  L(d  L)2  
X
i=1;2
i(d  i   bi)2:
We say that the leader is a good listener when L < L and a bad listener when L > L. As
we show in the next section, if the leader underestimates the importance of her information, she
places a smaller weight on her information and a larger weight on the followers' opinions in making
the decision than what is optimal in terms of ex-post organizational eciency. On the other hand,
if the leader overestimates the importance of her information, she makes a decision with a larger
weight on her own information and a smaller weight on the followers' opinions.2
The followers can communicate their own information before the leader makes an organiza-
tional decision. Each follower sends a one-time costless message ri 2 [ si; si] to the leader.3 We
suppose that the leader can not commit any mechanism and monetary transfer contingent on the
messages, that is, any communication is cheap talk. We denote a rationally up-dated belief after
communication as mi  E[ijri] for i = 1; 2.
Finally, in order to make our model tractable, we put the following assumption.
Assumption 1. (i) b  min s12 ; s22 	, and (ii) jLj  min s12 ; s22 	.
2In the product-design example illustrated in Introduction, a biased weight may be explained by a biased com-
pensation contract for the CEO, without assuming the irrational belief on the importance of information. If the
shareholders of a rm can oer a compensation contract to the CEO contingent on the prot of each local market,
they can arbitrarily design the values of L and i for i = 1; 2.
3In discussion section, we examine a bilateral communication in which the leader can also send a one-time, costless,
and publicly-observable message to the followers before the followers send messages.
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In words, (i) suggests that the extent of the conict between the followers is not too large, and (ii)
suggests that the expected value of the leader's information is not extremely biased.
The game proceeds as follows:
1. The leader and the followers privately observe L and i for i = 1; 2.
2. The followers send their messages to the leader (they are not necessarily truthful).
3. The leader decides d.
4 Decision making
4.1 Organizational decision
The problem is solved backwards. From the rst order condition, the leader's decision is given by
d(L; r1; r2) =
L
L + 1 + 2
L +
1
L + 1 + 2
(m1 + b1) +
2
L + 1 + 2
(m2 + b2):
Note that the equilibrium decisions take the form d = zLL + z1(m1 + b1) + z2(m2 + b2) with
zL + z1 + z2 = 1. zi represents the degree of the leader's sensitivity toward follower i's opinion
in the decision-making. We refer to a vector z = (zL; z1; z2) as the leader's decision policy. The
decision policy of the leader who has the correct belief on L should be given by z
 = (zL; z

1 ; z

2) =
L
L+1+2
; 1L+1+2 ;
2
L+1+2

. If the leader is a good listener, zi > z

i for i = 1; 2, that is, a
good listener shows a highly sensitive attitude toward both followers' opinions. On the other hand,
if the leader is a bad listener, zi < z

i for i = 1; 2, that is, a bad listener shows a low sensitive
attitude toward both followers' opinions.
4.2 Communication strategy
Before we consider the followers' communication strategy, we show that the followers have incentives
to misrepresent the information they possess. Suppose that follower 1 can credibly misrepresent his
information, that is, he can arbitrarily choose the leader's posterior belief about the information.
For a given decision policy of the leader, the optimal posterior, denoted by m1, satises E[djm1 =
m1] = 1 + b1, or equivalently,
m1 =
1 + b1   zLL   z2E[m2 + b2]
z1
  b1:
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Dene functions B1 as
B1(1; z)  m1   1 =
(1  z1)(1 + b1)  zLL   z2E[m2 + b2]
z1
and q1 as
q1(z)  zLL+z2E[m2+b2]1 z1   b1:
B1(1; z) represents the dierence between what follower 1 wants the leader to believe and his
true information. The rst term of q1(z) is interpreted as an expected collective opinion of the
other organizational members from 1's viewpoint weighted by z, and it is straightforward to show
B1(q1(z); z) = 0. Intuitively, if 1 = q1(z), follower 1's ideal decision is identical to the expected
collective opinion, then he has no incentive to misrepresent his information. However, he has the
incentive to exaggerate his information whenever 1 6= q1(z). Follower 1 induces a higher posterior
belief than his true information when 1 is higher than q1(z) and a lower posterior belief when 1 is
lower than q1(z). Moreover, jB1(1; z)j increases as 1 is further away from q1(z). Thus, the greater
the dierence between follower 1's ideal decision and the expected collective opinion, the stronger
the incentive for misrepresentation.
We dene functions B2 as
B2(2; z)  m2   2 =
(1  z2)(2 + b2)  zLmL   z1E[m1 + b1]
z2
and q2 as
q2(z)  zLmL+z1E[m1+b1]1 z2   b2:
Follower 2 also has no incentive to reveal his information truthfully but rather an incentive to
exaggerate his information whenever 2 6= q2(z). The incentive for misrepresentation becomes
larger as the dierence between 2 and q2(z) increases in the same manner as follower 1.
While truth-telling equilibrium does not exist, partially informative communication may still
be achieved as shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982). It is achieved by partitioning the type space
so that any message ri reveals only that i belongs to some interval. Divide follower i's type space
into Ni intervals and name cuto points from left as aij for j = 0; :::; Ni, which satises boundary
conditions ai0 =  si and aiNi = si and order constraints aij < aij+1. In equilibrium, follower i
sends a randomized message that is drawn from the uniform distribution supported on [aij 1; aij)
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if i 2 [aij 1; aij). If the receipt message is in [aij 1; aij), the leader's posterior belief is given by
mij =
aij 1+aij
2 . On each cuto point, follower i is indierent between reporting that i belongs to
either one of the two intervals around that cuto point. That is, any cuto aij for j = 1; :::Ni   1
must satisfy the following indierent condition,
Ei[ji = aij ;mi = mij ] = Ei[ji = aij ;mi = mij+1]: (1)
Solving and arranging (1), we obtain the second order dierence equation as follows; for j =
1; :::; Ni   1,
aij+1   aij = aij   aij 1 + 4Bi(aij ; z): (2)
Cutos in an equilibrium are depicted in Figure 1. In gure 1, we put s1 = 1, z1 = z2 = 1=3,
and b = 1=3. From the second order dierence equation (2), we can see how Bi(aij ; z) determines
the size of each interval. At any cuto aij such that aij < qi(z) = 1=2, the size of the interval
aij+1   aij is smaller than the size of the preceding intervals aij   aij 1 by 4jBi(aij ; z)j, and the
changes in the sizes of intervals decrease as j increases. The change in the size of the intervals
becomes quite small when aij is near qi(z). In turn, at any cuto aij such that aij > qi(z), the size
of the interval aij+1 aij is larger than the size of the preceding intervals aij aij 1 by 4jBi(aij ; z)j,
and the changes in the sizes of intervals increase as j increases.
 1 0 1 10:348 0:5510:5
q1(z)
a10 a11 a1N1 1 a1N1  
Figure 1: Communication strategy
There is no upper bound for the number of equilibrium cutos except for the case where qi(z)
is extremely high or low. The following lemma identies a sucient condition to ensure that Ni is
not limited.
Lemma 1. For i = 1; 2, the upper bound of Ni does not exist if qi(z) 2 [ si; si].
The proof is in Appendix. In words, the limit disappears when the follower possibly has an infor-
mation that is identical to the expected collective opinion, in terms of 1's expectation, with strict
positive probability. Intuitively, if qi(z) 2 [ si; si], we can nd the equilibrium, in which an innite
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number of intervals exist around qi(z) with negligibly small size. We remark that Assumption 1
ensures that qi(z) 2 [ si; si] for any z.
To summarize the results so far, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Given the leader's decision policy z, for i = 1; 2 for
any positive integer Ni there exists at least one equilibrium such that
1. follower i sends the randomized message ri, which is drawn from the uniform distribution
supported on [aij 1; aij) if i 2 [aij 1; aij) for j = 1; :::Ni   1 and on [aiNi 1; aiNi ] if i 2
[aiNi 1; aiNi ],
2. the leader makes her belief mi as
aij 1+aij
2 if ri is in [aij 1; aij) for j = 1; :::Ni   1 and
aiNi 1+aiNi
2 if the receipt message ri is in [aiNi 1; aiNi ], and
3. for j = 1; :::; Ni   1, aij follows (2), and ai0 =  si and aiNi = si.
The proof is in Appendix.
Note that when Ni is large enough any cutos can be approximately represented by the following
explicit form; for the j-th cuto from the left edge,
aij =   1x(zi)j si +

1  1
x(zi)j

qi(z); (3)
and for the j-th cuto from the right edge,
aiNi j =
1
x(zi)j
si +

1  1
x(zi)j

qi(z): (4)
where x(zi) =
 

2  4
zi

+
r
2  4
zi
2 4
2 > 1. The derivations are in Appendix. Then, j-th cuto from
the left (resp. right) edge is represented as an internally divided point between the left (resp. right)
edge and qi(z) in the ratio
1
x(zi)j
: 1  1
x(zi)j
.
4.3 Quality of communication
A residual variance E[(i  mi)2] indicates how the information that follower i provides is precise.
If the updated posterior belief of the leader about i's information is close to (resp. far from) his
true one, it becomes small (resp. large). By applying the law of iterated expectation, we obtain
E[(i   mi)2] = E[2i ]   E[m2i ]. Because E[2i ] is independent of the equilibrium prole and the
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residual variance decrease as E[m2i ] goes up, we refer to E[m
2
i ]as the quality of communication with
follower i.
The quality of communication with follower i increases as Ni goes up, that is, the more intervals,
the more precise the communication.
Lemma 2. E[m2i ] is increasing in Ni.
Proof is in Appendix. As we see in the next section, a high quality of communication also im-
proves the organizational performance, except for some extreme cases. Therefore, the following
section focuses on the equilibrium with an innite partitioned communication strategy, in which
the organizational performance is maximized within any partitioned communication strategy. In
the innitely partitioned equilibrium, the residual variance is simply given by
lim
Ni!1
E[(i  mi)2] = 1  zi
4  zi

s2i
3
+ qi(z)
2

and the quality of communication with i is given by
lim
Ni!1
E[m2i ] =
1
4  zi s
2
i  
1  zi
4  zi qi(z)
2: (5)
We denote limNi!1E[m2i ] by Mi(zi; qi(z)). If Assumption 1 holds Mi(zi; qi(z)) is well-dened.
Two key parameters, zi and qi(z), characterize the quality of communication with follower i.
From (5), it is straightforward to observe that the following property exists.
Lemma 3. (i) @Mi@zi (zi; q)

q=qi(z)
> 0. (ii) @Mi@qi (zi; 0) = 0 and
@2Mi
@q2i
(zi; q) < 0.
Figure 2 depicts a change in cutos as z1 increases, for xed q1. In gure 2, we put s1 = 1
and z1 = 1=2 and x q1 = 1=2. Because
1
x(zi)j
increases as z1 increases for any j, according to (3)
and (4), any cutos to the left (resp. right) of q1 shift toward left (resp. right) edge. Thus, the
equilibrium partitions on both sides become "ne", and the quality of communication is improved
as z1 increases, for a given xed q1. Comparing with the case in gure 1, a11 shifts to 0:243 from
0:348 and a1N1 1 shifts to 0:586 from 0:551, and the quality of communication is improved to 1=4
from 5=22.
Lemma 3 (ii) means that Mi is single peaked at qi = 0. Figure 3 depicts a change in cutos as
q1(> 0) increases, for a given xed z1. In gure 3, we put s1 = 1 and q1 = 0:75 and x z1 = 1=3.
According to (3) and (4), any cutos shift toward the right as q1 increases, then the equilibrium
partitions to the right of q1 become "ne", but ones to the left of q1 become "coarse". Comparing
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 1 0 1 10:243 0:5860:5
q1
a10 a11 a1N1 1 a1N1  
Figure 2: Communication strategy with z1 = 1=2, given xed q1
with the case in gure 1, a11 shifts to 0:573 from 0:348 and a1N1 1 shifts to 0:775 from 0:551, and the
quality of communication declines to 15=88 from 5=22. Note that the residual variance becomes
large as the sizes of larger intervals increase even if the sizes of smaller intervals decrease. In
contrast, the residual variance becomes small when the sizes of larger intervals decrease even if the
sizes of smaller intervals increase. Then, the residual variance is minimized when the equilibrium
partitions are symmetric around zero, that is, when q1 = 0.
 1 0 1 10:573
0:775
0:75
q1
a10 a11 a1N1 1 a1N1
Figure 3: Communication strategy with q1 = 3=4, given xed z1
5 The leader's belief about the importance of information, the
quality of communication, and the organizational performance
Here, we examine how distortions in L aect the quality of communication and the organizational
performance. To make intuition of the results clear, we put 1 = 2 =  > 0 and L = 0 in the
following sections unless otherwise noted.
5.1 The leader's belief about the importance of information and the quality of
communication
We consider how a decrease in L aect the quality of communication with follower i. The marginal
eect can be represented as follows;
 @Mi
@ 
(zi; qi(z)) =
@Mi
@zi
(zi; q)

q=qi(z)

  @zi
@ L

+
@Mi
@qi
(zi; qi)

  @qi
@ L
(z)

: (6)
Note that @Mi@zi (zi; q)

q=qi(z)
> 0 from Lemma 3 (i). Because   @zi@ L > 0, the rst term of (6) is
always positive. The rst term of (6) is interpreted as the positive side of a good listener, which
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is coming from the notion that follower i's incentive to misrepresent information becomes weaker
according to the leader's willingness to incorporate i's opinions into organizational decisions.
On the other hand, the second term of (6) represents the negative side of a good listener. To
see this, we focus on the quality of communication with follower 1. Because
q1(z) =
zLL + z2E[m2 + b2]
1  z1   b1 (7)
=
L + 2
L + 
b > 0; (8)
we obtain   @q1@ L (z) > 0. In the same manner, since
q2(z) =
zLL + z1E[m1 + b1]
1  z2   b2 (9)
=   L + 2
L + 
b < 0; (10)
we obtain   @q2@ L (z) < 0. Note that, for i = 1; 2,
@Mi
@qi
(zi; qi) > 0 if qi < 0 and
@Mi
@qi
(zi; qi) < 0 if
qi > 0 from Lemma 3 (ii). Those imply that the second term of (6) is always negative. The result
above is interpreted as follows. While a good listener gives follower 1's opinion signicant weight in
the decision, she also gives follower 2's opinion a signicant weight. This implies that from follower
1's view point, the voice of the rival becomes more inuential, and the collective opinion becomes
biased toward the rival's ideal decision. If follower 1 believes that the rival has a greatly dierent
ideal decision from his, follower 1's incentive to exaggerate his information becomes strong in order
to change the leader's mind against the rival's voice.
Even though the negative side of a good listener may exist, however, it can be negligible when
b is quite small. As b decreases, qi become less sensitive to the change in L. Therefore, we arrive
at the next proposition, which identies the situation in which the leader's overestimation of the
importance improves the quality of communication with the followers.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 (i) holds. Mi is increased as L decreases if and only if
b2 <
(L + )
2
(L + 2)(5L + 8)
s2i : (11)
In Appendix, we provide the proof and conrm the existence of the threshold within the area
restricted by Assumption 1. Proposition 2 claims that when the conict between the followers
is not severe, a good listener is more likely to improve the quality of communication because the
negative side of a good listener is quite small and the only positive side arises in that case. However,
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if the conict is severe, the negative side is no longer negligible and a bad listener can elicit more
information than a good listener.
5.2 Performance
Next, we consider how a decrease in L aect the organizational performance. The ex-ante expected
organizational performance is represented as
E[] =  LE[(d(L; r1; r2)  L)2] 
X
i=1;2
E[(d(L; r1; r2)  i   bi)2]
=  (L(1  zL)2 + 2z2L)2L   
s21
3
  s
2
2
3
 z1(z1(L + 2)  2)E[m21]  z2(z2(L + 2)  2)E[m22]
 L((1  zL)L   z1b1   z2b2)2
 ((1  z1)b1   zLL   z2b2)2   ((1  z2)b2   zLL   z1b1)2: (12)
Then the marginal eect of a decrease in L on the organizational performance is represented by
 @E[]
@ L
=   @E[]
@ L

M1=M1(z1;q1(z));M2=M2(z2;q2(z))
+
@E[]
@M1

 @M1
@ L
(z1; q1(z))

+
@E[]
@M2

 @M2
@ L
(zi; qi(z))

: (13)
The rst term of (13) represents the direct eect of a decrease in  on the organizational perfor-
mance. The second and third terms of (13) represent the strategic eect of a decrease in  on
the quality of communication.4 We can further separate the strategic eect into two. The rst
eect is how  aects the quality of communication, and the second eect is how the quality of
communication aects the organizational performance.
We focus on a slight distortion of L from L. By doing so, we can neglect any direct eect by
applying the envelope theorem. It is straightforward to show that @E[]@Mi > 0 at L = L, that is,
the organizational performance is improved as the quality of communication is improved. Then,
using proposition 2, we may identify one case where a good listener can improves the organizational
performance.
4If communication is not strategic, because the strategic eect should be zero, it immediately follows that the
optimal decision policy should be z.
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Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 (i) holds. A slight decrease in L at L = L improves the
organizational performance if
b2 <
(L + )
2
2(L + 2)(5L + 8)
(s21 + s
2
2):
Otherwise, a slight increase in L at L = L improves the organizational performance.
Proposition 3 claims that a good listener can achieves a better performance if the conict between
the followers is not severe, and otherwise a bad listener can achieves better performance.
5.3 One leader and one follower case
A good listener always improves the quality of communication in the case of one leader and one
follower. To treat that case in the same framework, we assume that 1 =  and 2 = 0. If
2 = 0, follower 2's information does not matter for the organizational performance and follower
2's opinion is never incorporated into the organizational decision. Thus, the problem under the the
assumption is identical to one in the organization in which the leader and only follower 1 exist. In
this case, from (7), q1(z) =  b1 then q1(z) is independent of L. It implies that the negative side of
a good listener disappears in this case, though the positive side exists. Then, the next proposition
immediately follows.
Proposition 4. If one leader and only follower 1 exist in the organization, M1 is always increased
as L decreases. A slight increase in L at L = L always improves the organizational perfor-
mance.
6 Discussion
6.1 A Biased opinion of the leader
The value of being a good listener is also dependent on the opinion of the leader. The negative
side of a good listener disappears if the leader's opinion is extremely biased. To demonstrate this,
we assume L 6= 0 and focus on the quality of communication with follower 1. Note that
@M1(z1; q1)
@q1

 @q1(z)
@ L

=
2(L   b)(LL + (L + 2)b)
(L + )2(4+ 7)
: (14)
From (14), if L    L+2L b then the negative side does not exist. Intuitively, if the leader has an
extremely biased opinion in a negative direction, the collective opinion is also extremely biased in
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a negative direction. In this case, q1(z) goes toward zero as the voice of follower 2 become slightly
inuential, because follower 2's ideal decision is biased in a positive direction. Nor does the negative
side exist if b  L. Intuitively, the collective opinion is extremely biased in a positive direction
and q1(z) is larger than b2 in this case. Then, since the bias of follower 2's ideal decision is more
moderate than that of the leader's opinion in the sense of expectation, the collective opinion goes
toward zero as the voice of follower 2 becomes more inuential.
The negative side of a good listener remains if the bias of the leader's opinion is moderate, that
is,   L+2L b < L < b. Because q1(z) > 0 and  
@q1(z)
@ L
> 0 in this case, Lemma 3 suggests that the
negative side exists. The seriousness of the negative side is dependent on L. Note that
@
@L

@M1(z1; q1)
@q1

 @q1(z)
@ L

=
4(LL + b)
(L + )2(4+ 7)
: (15)
From (15), we derive that the negative side is the most serious when L =   L b. We can show
that the negative side on the quality of communication with follower 2 disappears if L   b or
L+
L
b  L, the negative side exists if  b < L < L+L b, and it is the most serious when L = L b
in the same manner.
From the discussion above, we can show that the negative side of a good listener is weak or
diminished when the leader's opinion is somewhat biased, that is, when L <   L b and L b < L.
If   L b < L < L b, the trade-o is such that the negative side on the quality of communication
with follower 1 becomes weak but that with follower 2 becomes strong as L increases. In this case,
although a decrease in L aects the quality of communication with each follower heterogeneously,
the sum of them is more likely to be improved as L decreases. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. A good listener is more likely to improve the quality
of communication with both followers when the leader has a biased opinion.
Proof in Appendix.
6.2 Heterogeneous sensitivity
In this subsection, we consider a case in which the leader shows heterogeneous sensitivity toward
each follower's opinion. Our concern here is to examine whether heterogeneous sensitivity is at-
tractive or not, and if so, when it is attractive. Thus, we suppose here that, although the leader
has a rational belief in the importance of her own information, the importance of either follower's
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information is overestimated, that is, 1 = 1 +  and 2 = 2    where  2 R.The leader's
objective is given by
 =  L(d  L)2  
X
i=1;2
i(d  i   bi)2: (16)
Then, the leader's decision policy, denoted by z, is given by
zL =
L
L + 2
; z1 =
+ 
L + 2
; and z2 =
  
L + 2
:
Because z1 is increasing in , the leader becomes more sensitive to follower 1's opinion and gives
it a large weight in the decision as  increases. Similarly, because z2 is decreasing in , the leader
becomes less sensitive to follower 2's opinion giving a small weight in the decision as  increases.
Thus, we can interpret  as the degree of favoritism toward follower 1.
As  increases, the quality of communication with follower 1 always improves, but that with
follower 2 always declines. Note that
q1(z
) =
L + 2  2
L +    b > 0
q2(z
) =  L + 2+ 2
L + + 
b < 0;
and it is straightforward to show that @q1@ (z
) < 0 and @q2@ (z
) < 0. Then, from Lemma 3, we
obtain that @M1@ (z

1; q1(z
)) > 0 and @M2@ (z

2; q2(z
)) < 0. This suggests that heterogeneity in the
leader's sensitivity has a trade-o eect on the quality of communication with each follower. The
following proposition identies a situation in which the heterogeneity improves the organizational
performance.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Some small  improves the organizational perfor-
mance if s1 > s2.
Proposition 6 claims that the leader should be sensitive to the opinion of the follower whose infor-
mation varies widely from that of the other. To make the intuition clear, we suppose an extreme
example in which s2 is near zero. Though the information of both followers is equivalently important
for the organizational performance, the leader does not need to extract information from follower
2 because without communication almost accurate information can be extrapolated. In such case,
it is eective to be sensitive toward follower 1's opinion in order to extract more information from
him, even if the quality of communication with follower 2 declines.
26
In gures 4 and 5, we compare the communication strategies under decision policy z and that
under decision policy z when s1 > s2. Figure 4 illustrates the partitions of type spaces in the
equilibrium when the decision policy is z. The leader can know which grid the followers' private
information lies in. Under z, follower 1's type space is divided by relatively coarser partitions
than follower 2's type space. Figure 5 illustrates the partitions of type spaces in the equilibrium
when the decision policy is z with  > 0. As  increases, the size of the partitions in follower 1's
type space becomes "ner" and that of the partitions in follower 2's type space becomes "coarser".
In this case, the grids become more balanced, whereupon the sum of residual variances E[(1  
m1)
2] +E[(2  m2)2] decreases and the leader can infer the ideal decisions of both followers more
precisely on average.
2
1
q2(z
)
q1(z
)
 s1 s1
s2
 s2
Figure 4: The partitions of type spaces under
decision policy z.
1
2
q2(z
)
q1(z
)
 s1 s1
s2
 s2
Figure 5: The partitions of type spaces under
decision policy z with  > 0.
6.3 The leader's condence in communication skills
In this subsection, we attempt to give another explanation for why the leader's decision policy is
distorted, from the viewpoint of the leader's condence in her own communication skill. Although
we suppose that the leader has the correct belief on the importance of her own information here, we
introduce two alternative assumptions regarding her skill level in interpreting followers' messages
correctly. First, the leader misinterprets a follower's message with probability  and unconsciously
forms a wrong posterior which is independent of the message. Formally, when follower i sends
message ri to the leader, she receives it with probability 1  but receives an independent random
message, denoted by rj , with probability , and she is unaware of misinterpreting it.
5 Second,
5Here we employ the same framework as that for communication noise, which was introduced by Blume et al.
(2007).
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the leader may have a wrong belief in her own communication skill. Let  be her belief on the
probability of misinterpretation. We say that the leader is overcondent if  <  and undercondent
if  > .
The leader's posterior belief after communication is then represented as
EL[i j ri] = (1  )mi + E[E[i j ri]]
= (1  )mi; (17)
and the leader's decision policy, denoted by z is given by
zL =
L
L + 2
; z1 =
(1  )
L + 2
z2 =
(1  )
L + 2
:
We remark that the decision policy is determined by the leader's belief in her communication skill,
not by the skill itself. Because the leader believes that she has not formed a correct assessment of
one follower's message with probability , the probability of misinterpretation is taken into account
optimally discounting the weight on the followers' opinions in decision-making. The overcondent
(resp. undercondent) leader puts an excessively large (resp. small) weight on followers' opinion
and a small (resp. large) weight on her own information. We can then discuss how self-condence
aects the quality of communication in almost the same manner as we considered the leader's
overestimation, and we then obtain a similar claim to Proposition 2 and 3 without qualitative
dierences as follows.
Proposition 7. Suppose Assumption 1 (i) holds. The overcondent leader in her communication
skill improves the quality of communication with i if
b2 <
L + (1  )
(L + 2)(5L + (8 + 2))
s2i :
Furthermore, a leader's slight overcondence in her communication skill improves the organizational
performance if
b2 <
L + (1  )
2(L + 2)(5L + (8 + 2))
(s21 + s
2
2):
Proof in Appendix.
7 Bilateral communication
In this section, we consider a bilateral-communication situation whereby the leader can sends a
one-time costless message concerning her own information to the followers. We suppose that the
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message of the leader is publicly observable and that the followers send messages after receiving
and observing the leader's message. 6 Denote the leader's message as rL 2 R and posterior beliefs
about the leader's information after communication as mL  E[LjrL].
While the leader's message does not aect the decision policy and the organizational perfor-
mance directly, it can aect the amount of information the followers provide to the leader. Given
the leader's message rL and decision policy z, the followers communication strategy is derived by
the following indierent condition;
Ei[iji = aij ;mi = mij ; rL] = Ei[iji = aij ;mi = mij+1; rL]: (18)
Solving and arranging (18), we obtain the second order dierence equation that is same as (2). The
dierence from the unilateral-communication situation is that Bi and qi is the function of mL such
that
B1(1; z) =
(1 z1)(1+b1) zLmL z2E[m2+b2]
z1
B2(1; z) =
(1 z2)(2+b2) zLmL z1E[m1+b1]
z2
;
and
q1(z) =
zLmL+z2E[m2+b2]
1 z1   b1
q2(z) =
zLmL+z1E[m1+b1]
1 z2   b2:
Thus, the collective opinion can be dependent on the leader's message in the context of bilateral-
communication.
As we considered the followers' communication strategy in unilateral-communication, likewise
we may rst consider the leader's incentive to misrepresent her information. Suppose that the
leader can credibly misrepresent her information, that is, she can arbitrarily choose the followers'
posterior beliefs. The optimal posterior, denoted by mL, maximizes the leader's objective for given
L:
mL = argmaxmL EL[ jL;mL]: (19)
From (12), because the leader's message aect the organizational performance only through changes
in Mi, the problem can be represented as
max
mL
P (M1;M2)  z1(z1(L + 2)  2)M1 + z2(z2(L + 2)  2)M2: (20)
6Even if the message is not public but private, the results can hold.
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Under the assumption that 1 = 2, the rst order condition gives that m

L = 0, then the leader
has an incentive to misrepresent her information unless L = 0. Furthermore, since
@2P (M1;M2)
@m2L
< 0,
the leader's objective is single peaked and symmetric around zero with regard to mL.
Given @
2P (M1;M2)
@m2L
< 0, the number of the posteriors induced in equilibrium is two at most.
We refer to an equilibrium where the leader induces two dierent posteriors as binary equilibrium.
Then, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 8. In equilibrium, the leader's communication strategy may take only two forms;
babbling strategy or binary strategy.
Proof in Appendix. Only in binary equilibrium, the leader sends an informative message to the
followers.
The posteriors induced in binary equilibrium are not uniquely determined. For example, L is a
random variable drawn from a uniform distribution on [ 1; 1]. Consider the following communica-
tion strategy. If L < 0 the leader sends message "A" with probability p and "B" with probability
1 p, and if L  0 she sends message "B" with probability p and "A" with probability 1 p where
1=2 < p  1. Given that, the posterior of the followers after observing each message is represented
as E[LjrL = A] =  p=2+(1 p)=2 =  (2p 1)=2 and E[LjrL = B] =  (1 p)=2+p=2 = (2p 1)=2
respectively. Since the leader's objective is symmetric around zero regardless of the information
she possess, the two posteriors are indierent for the leader then she does not have an incentive
to deviate from such a communication strategy. Then, an innite number of binary equilibrium
may exist, in which the two dierent posteriors characterized by p 2 (1=2; 1] are induced in each
equilibrium.7
Although an innite number of binary equilibrium may exist, all equilibrium can be Pareto
ranked. Let us denote k as an absolute value of the posteriors induced in each of the binary
equilibrium, that is, k = jmAL j = jmBL j where mAL and mBL are posteriors induced in equilibrium.
Then, each of the binary equilibrium can be characterized by k and k-binary equilibrium is dened,
in which the absolute value of the posteriors equals k. To make a countably innite partition
strategy of the followers feasible, we oer the following assumption.
Assumption 2. L is distributed within
  s2 ; s2, where s = min fs1; s2g.
7If we focus only on a binary partition strategy, binary equilibrium is unique.
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Assumption 2 ensures that k  min s12 ; s22 	, no matter what communication strategy the leader
follows. Then, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 9. Suppose Assumption 1 (i) and Assumption 2 hold. The quality of communication
and the organizational performance in babbling equilibrium are higher than those in binary equilib-
rium. The quality of communication and the organizational performance in k-binary equilibrium
are higher than those in k0-binary equilibrium for any k0 > k.
Proof in Appendix. The rst claim follows from the fact that k > jE[L]j has to hold, and the
second claim follows from the single peakedness of P (M1;M2) with regard to mL. Furthermore,
the following claim immediately follows from Proposition 5.
Corollary 1. Being a good listener is more likely to be valuable in any binary equilibrium than
the babbling equilibrium. Being a good listener is more likely to be valuable in k0-binary equilibrium
than k-binary equilibrium for any k < k0.
8 Concluding remarks
This article examines how a leader's sensitivity toward followers' opinions aects the amount of
information the followers provide. A good listener is more likely to facilitate communication with
followers when (i) conict between the followers is not severe and/or (ii) there is one leader and
one follower. Otherwise, it actually may hurt the quality of communication with the followers,
and a less sensitive leader, a bad listener, would be required. If the leader improves the quality of
communication, the organizational performance can be improved. The value of being a good listener
is enhanced when the followers believe that the leader has a biased opinion. The leader's favoritism
in decision-making can improve the organizational performance by means of balancing the bias
in the quality of communication. The degree of sensitivity is dependent on the leader's irrational
estimation on the importance of information and the leader's self-condence in her communication
skill. We also show that it is valuable for the leader to obfuscate her information, even if she can
communicates it with the followers, in order to elicit more information from them.
A few empirical implications arise from this study. One testable implication is that a sensitive
leader is not needed in matured organizations, because the members are more likely to be in conict
in those organizations. This is consistent with the nding of Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen
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(2012), who found that CEO's persistence is critical factor for the success in matured rms.8
Another implication is that a sensitive leader is not required in a rm that adopts diversication
strategy. In such a rm, it is feasible for each of the division managers to have dierent opinions
about the organizational direction.
Appendix
Derivation of (2), (3), and (4)
Note that
E1[djm1 = m] = zLL + z1(m+ b1) + z2(E[m2] + b2):
Substituting this into (1), we obtain
z21((m1j+1 + b1)
2   (m1j + b1)2)  2z1(m1j+1  m1j)(a1j + b1) + 2z1zL(m1j+1  m1j)L
+2z1z2(m1j+1  m1j)E[m2 + b2] = 0
! m1j+1 +m1j + 2b1   2 1
z1
(a1j + b1) + 2
zL
z1
mL + 2
z2
z1
(E[m2] + b2) = 0
! a1j+1   a1j = a1j   a1j 1 + 4(1  z1)(1 + b1)  zLL   z2E[m2 + b2]
z1
! a1j+1   a1j = a1j   a1j 1 + 4B1(a1j ; z):
We can obtain follower 2's communication strategy in the same manner. Together with the bound-
ary conditions ai0 =  si and aiNi = si, (2) yields a following explicit form of equilibrium cutos
as follows;
aij =
x(zi)
j   y(zi)j
x(zi)Ni   y(zi)Ni (si   qi(z)) +
x(zi)
Ni j   y(zi)Ni j
x(zi)Ni   y(zi)Ni ( si   qi(z)) + qi(z) (21)
where x(zi) =
 

2  4
zi

+
r
2  4
zi
2 4
2 and y(zi) =
 

2  4
zi

 
r
2  4
zi
2 4
2 . Since 2   4zi <  2 for any
zi 2 (0; 1), x(zi) > 1 and y(zi) < 1. Then, if Ni is large enough, j-th cuto from the left edge
can be approximately represented as (3), and j-th cuto from the right edge can be approximately
represented as (4).
8However, Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2012) did not nd signicant positive or negative eects on rms'
success in several traits related to a good listener, such as respect (values others, treating them fairly and showing
concern for their views and feelings), listening skill (lets others speak and seeks to understand their viewpoints), and
open to critic (often solicits feedback and reacts calmly to receiving criticism). One reason for the weak inconsistency
of their results to this study is that the current model does not capture other activities than communication for
ecient leadership. For example, Brunnermeier et al.(2012) emphasizes the importance of less sensitivity (in their
terminology, resoluteness) when organizational members' actions must be coordinated. Then, it is plausible that the
value of being a good listener can be canceled out if the needs for coordination is large.
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Proof of Lemma 1
It is straight forward to check that faijgj=0;1;:::Ni satisfy boundary constraints ai0 =  si and
aiNi = si for any Ni. Next, we show that faijgj=0;1;:::Ni satisfy the order constraints. For any Ni,
the rst term of (21) is not decreasing in j if si  qi(z) and strictly increasing in j if si > qi(z).
For any Ni, the second term of (21) is not decreasing in j if  si  qi(z) and strictly increasing in
j if  si < qi(z). Thus, if  si  qi(z)  si, aij is strictly increasing in j.
Proof of Proposition 1
What remains to show is that the number of partitions is not limited if Assumption 1 holds. Because
q1(z) + b1 is a convex combination of L and E[m2] + b2, L  q1(z) + b1  E[m2] + b2. Using
fact that E[m2] = 0, L   b1  q1(z)  b2   b1. Then, Assumption 1 immediately suggest that
 s  q1(z)  s, where s = minfs1; s2g. In the same manner, we can show that q2(z) is in [ s; s].
Applying Lemma 1, we thus complete the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
After some lengthy calculation, we obtain
E[m2i ] =
Ni 1X
j=0
Z aij+1
aij

aij+1 + aij
2
2 1
2si
di
=
1
8si
Ni 1X
j=0
(a3ij+1 + a
2
ij+1aij   aij+1a2ij   a3ij)
=
1
4
x(zi)
2 + 2x(zi) + 1
x(zi)2 + x(zi) + 1
s2i  
1
4
x(zi)
2   2x(zi) + 1
x(zi)2 + x(zi) + 1
qi(z)
2
 1
4
(x(zi)
2   1)2(x(zi)Ni(x(zi)Ni   1)2(s2i   qi(z)2) + 4x(zi)2Nis2i )
x(zi)(x(zi)2 + x(zi) + 1)(x(zi)Ni + 1)2(x(zi)Ni   1)2 (22)
Because the third term is strictly positive and decreasing in Ni, E[m
2
i ] is increase in Ni. (5) can
be derived by substituting x(zi) into (5) and taking the limit of Ni.
Proof of Proposition 2
For i = 1, the rst term and the second term of (6) are given as follows;
@M1
@z1
(z1; q)

q=q1(z)

  @z1
@ L

=
(L + )
2s21 + 3(LL + b(L + 2))
2
(L + )2(4L + 7)2
;
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and
@M1
@q1
(z1; q1)

  @q1
@ L
(z)

=
(L   b)(LL + b(L + 2)
(L + )2(4L + 7)
:
Then,  @Mi(zi;qi(z))@ L  0 if and only if
(L + )
2s21 + (LL + b(L + 2))(L(11L + 14)  b(5L + 8))  0: (23)
Substituting L = 0 into (23), we obtain proposition 2. In the same manner, we can derivate the
condition for i = 2.
Finally, we conrm the condition that the threshold of b2 specied in proposition 2 exist inh
0;min
n
s21
4 ;
s22
4
oi
. Note that minfL;g
(L+)
2
(L+2)(5L+8)
= 116 . Then, for i = 1; 2 , the threshold
that satises (11) exists in that area for any (L; ) as long as js1   s2j is not extremely large.
Proof of Proposition 5
Note that
 @M1(z1; q1(z))
@ L
  @M2(z2; q2(z))
@ L
= 
(L + )
2(s21 + s
2
2)  (L + 2)(5L + 8)b2 + L(11L + 14)m2L
(L + )2(4L + 7)2
:
Then,  @M1(z1;q1(z))@ L  
@M2(z2;q2(z))
@ L
is more likely to be positive as jLj increases. Applying envelop
theorem, we can show that the organizational performance can be improved ifM1+M2 is increased
as L decrease at L = L in the same manner as Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 6
We show that a slight increase in  at  = 0 makes the organizational performance better. At rst,
we derive the marginal eect of an increase in  on the quality of communication. Note that
@M1(z1; q1(z))
@
=
L + 2
(4L + 7  )2 s
2
1 +
2(L + 2  2)(112L + 26L + 122   (8L + 12))
(L +   e)2(4L + 7  )2 b
2
and
@M2(z2; q2(z))
@
=   L + 2
(4L + 7+ )2
s22  
2(L + 2+ 2)(11
2
L + 26L + 12
2 + (8L + 12))
(L + + e)2(4L + 7  )2 b
2:
Next, we derive the marginal eect of an increase in  on the organizational performance at
 = 0. Using envelop theorem, we obtain
@E[]
@

=0
=
@E[]
@M1
@M1(z1; q1(z))
@

=0
+
@E[]
@M1
@M1(z1; q1(z))
@

=0
:
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At  = 0, @E[]@M1 =
@E[]
@M2
> 0 from (12), and
@M1(z1; q1(z))
@

=0
+
@M1(z1; q1(z))
@

=0
=
L + 2
(4L + 7)2
(s21   s22):
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Applying the same procedure as Proposition 1, we can show that the following equilibrium exist.
When Assumption 1 holds, given the leader's decision policy z, for i = 1; 2, for any positive integer
Ni there exists at least one equilibrium such that
1. follower i sends the randomized message ri, which is drawn from the uniform distribution
supported on [aij 1; aij) if i 2 [aij 1; aij) for j = 1; :::Ni   1 and on [aiNi 1; aiNi ] if i 2
[aiNi 1; aiNi ],
2. the leader makes her belief mi as (1  )aij 1+aij2 if ri is in [aij 1; aij) for j = 1; :::Ni  1 and
(1  )aiNi 1+aiNi2 if the receipt message ri is in [aiNi 1; aiNi ], and
3. for j = 1; :::; Ni, aij follows
aij+1   aij = aij   aij 1 + 4Bi(aij ; z); (24)
and ai0 =  si and aiNi = si
Then, the quality of communication with i is given by Mi(z

i ; qi(z
)). It is straightforward to show
@Mi
@
(zi ; qi(z
)) =
@Mi
@zi
(zi ; q) jq=qi(z)
@zi
@
+
@Mi
@qi
(zi ; qi)
@qi
@
(z) (25)
=   (L + 2)
(4L + (7 + ))2
s2i +
(L + 2)
2(5L + (8 + 2)
(4L + (7 + ))2(+L(1 + ))2
b2: (26)
The rst statement of the proposition immediately follows from (26).
Applying the envelope theorem, we obtain
@E[]
@

=
=
@E[]
@M1
@M1
@
(z1 ; q1(z
))

=
+
@E[]
@M2
@M2
@
(z2 ; q2(z
))

=
: (27)
35
Note that @E[
]
@M1

=
= @E[
]
@M2

=
> 0, because the expected organizational performance is given
by
E[] =  (1  )2(LE[(d(L; r1; r2)  L)2] +
X
i=1;2
E[(d(L; r1; r2)  i   bi)2])
 (1  )(LE[(d(L; r1; r2)  L)2] +
X
i=1;2
E[(d(L; r1; r2)  i   bi)2])
 (1  )(LE[(d(L; r1; r2)  L)2] +
X
i=1;2
E[(d(L; r1; r2)  i   bi)2])
 2(LE[(d(L; r1; r2)  L)2] +
X
i=1;2
E[(d(L; r1; r2)  i   bi)2])
=  (L(1  zL)2 + 2z2L)2L   
s21
3
  s
2
2
3
 z1(z1(L + 2)  2(1  ))E[m21]  z2(z2(L + 2)  2(1  ))E[m22]
 L((1  zL)L   z1b1   z2b2)2
 ((1  z1)b1   zLL   z2b2)2   ((1  z2)b2   zLL   z1b1)2:
Thus, the second statement of the proposition holds.
Proof of Proposition 8
First, we show that P (M1;M2) is single peaked at mL = 0. Substituting Mi into (20), the rst
order condition gives
mL =
(1  z1 + z2)(4  z2)(1  z2) + ( 1  z1 + z2)(4  z1)(1  z1)
zL((1  z1)(4  z1) + (1  z2)(4  z2)) b: (28)
If 1 = 2, z1 = z2 then m

L = 0. Note that
@2P (M1;M2)
@m2L
=   2z
2
L
(4  z1)(1  z1)  
2z2L
(4  z2)(1  z2) < 0: (29)
Next, we show that the number of the posterior the leader induces is two at most. Suppose
that the leader induces more than three posteriors in equilibrium. Then, two some posteriors mAL
and mBL exist, which satisfy jmAL j > jmBL j > 0. Because the leader's objective is single peaked at
mL = 0, the leader always strictly prefer to induce m
B
L than m
A
L . This is contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 9
First, we prove the rst statement. Let the posterior induced in binary equilibrium be mAL and m
B
L
where mAL < m
B
L . Because P (M1;M2) is symmetric around zero, those have to satisfy m
A
L < 0 and
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mBL > 0. Let p be the probability with which the leader induces m
A
L and 1   p be the probability
with which the leader induces mBL . Note that
E[L] = pm
A
L + (1  p)mBL :
Then, either mAL < 0  L < mBL or mAL < L  0 < mBL has to hold. Thus, the rst statement
follows from the fact that P (M1;M2) is single peaked at mL = 0. The second statement is also
immediately follows from the single peakedness of P (M1;M2).
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Chapter 3.
The value of a leader's initiative in an adapta-
tion and coordination problem
1 Introduction
Organizational economists consider constraints on information transmission a critical determinant
of an organizational design. Marschak and Radner (1972) develop a team theoretic model and
discuss optimal decision-making processes with dispersed information and constraints on commu-
nication. The team theoretic model depicts a typical trade-o problem between adaptation and
coordination in organizations. In the model, each divisional activity must be not only adapted to
environment but also coordinated to the others' activities. It is dicult to resolve the trade-o
problem in an ecient manner, because of members' lack of knowledge for the other divisions'
environment and physical or strategic constraints on communication.
Some researchers indicate that leadership helps to resolve the trade-o problem. Dewan and
Myatt (2008) and Brunnermeier, Bolton, and Veldkamp (2013) claim that it is important that
leaders provide a vision at an early stage. We interpret the leader's decision-making in early stages
as the leader's initiative. Through making a vision, followers can foresee future decisions of other
members and better coordination is attainable. However, these studies neglect the case in which
members' incentives are not aligned to the interest of the organization and followers strategically
communicate with each other, despite that such consideration is plausible in actual organizations.
How does the leader's initiative aect the followers decisions in a strategic situation within the
context of adaptation and coordination problems, and should the leader take an initiative?
To answer these questions, we examine the following adaptation and coordination model in this
study. In our model, there exist one leader(headquarter) and two followers(division managers) who
make decisions. The follower's objective is characterized by two factors; one is adaptation that
requires consistency between each follower's decision and each local environment and another one
is coordination that requires consistency between each follower's decision and an organizational
decision made by the leader. The organizational performance is dened as the sum of both follow-
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ers' objectives. Each local environment is independent and private information for each follower.
The followers are in conict ex ante in the sense that their environment follows a heterogeneous
distribution. Simultaneous one-time communication is possible. There exist two decision-making
processes for the leader. In the rst process, that is associated with the leader's initiative, the
leader makes an organizational decision by relying on messages from the followers before the fol-
lowers make decisions. In the second process, the leader postpones her decision after the followers
make their own decisions and makes an organizational decision considering the observed followers'
decisions.
We shed light on not only the positive side but also the negative side of the leader's initiative.
Indeed, if the leader makes an organizational decision before the followers do, there is no room
for the followers to manipulate it. The followers' local problems are then separately solved in the
most ecient manner for the given organizational decision. In other words, the leader's initiative
makes the followers' incentives well-aligned. However, the leader faces the risk of making a wrong
organizational decision due to limited knowledge of local environment. The followers attempt to
manipulate the leader's decision through wrong reports; the information the leader can access is
limited and the organizational decision can be inecient ex post.
The decision-making process without the leader's initiative can be better than the process with
the leader's initiative. If the leader does not take an initiative, she can access correct knowledge
regarding which decision is ecient through observing the followers' decisions. Then, the leader
always makes an ecient decision in the ex-post sense and communication is unnecessary. Un-
doubtedly, even though the leader has access to complete knowledge, taking no initiative has a
negative inuence on the followers' decisions, because the followers try to manipulate an organiza-
tional decision via excessive adaptation, that is, the followers make decisions with excessively large
weight on their own information. While excessive adaptation does pay for each follower, this cause
local decisions to be ineciently distorted from ex-post ecient levels.
The value of the leader's initiative is dependent on the relative importance of adaptation over
coordination. When the importance of coordination is relatively greater than the importance of
adaptation, the process with the leader's initiative has an advantage over one without it, because
the loss from excessive adaptation is more than the loss that is coming from miscommunication.
However, the opposite is true otherwise by the opposite reason.
A remarkable result of the study is that the ex-ante conict (the extent of heterogeneity of
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local environment) among the followers aects the value of the leader's initiative in dierent ways
between non-strategic communication case and strategic communication case. Although the quality
of communication is independent of the ex-ante conict in non-strategic communication case, it is
dependent in strategic communication case and becomes worse as the ex-ante conict increases.
Then, the relative superiority of the leader's initiative over no initiative is diminished as the ex-
ante conict increases when communication is strategic. This is counterintuitive to the prevailing
knowledge that strong leadership is required when members are in serious conict.
We use the word "coordination" in a dierent sense from the standard model, in which better
coordination implies that followers' decisions are consistent with those of the other followers. To
explain these situations, we assume the following example of a multi-divisional rm with one CEO
and two local divisional managers. Each divisional manager invests into a certain production
technology, which determines the quality of the product of each division. Two factors determine
each division's prot. The rst one, which is associated with adaptation, is consistency between
the quality of the product and the consumers' needs in the local market. If the product meets the
consumers' needs, the sales result is maximized. The second is a developing cost from a product that
is jointly developed with the other division. The developing cost is minimized when the division's
technology is consistent with the design of the joint product. The CEO's task in this regard is
making the design of the joint product to maximize the two divisions' prots. However, since each
division is likely to face a dierent market condition, the respective managers are frequently in
serious conict regarding which joint product should be developed.
2 Related literature
Many researchers have studied the tradeo between adaptation and coordination and the optimal
decision-making process in organizational economics. Marschak and Radner (1972) construct the
team theoretic model, in which decisions are needed to be coordinated but communication is costly
due to physical reasons. Building on their work, Cremer (1980) and Dessein and Santos (2006)
discuss how multiple tasks are bundled from the perspective of reducing coordination loss led by
limited communication, and Aoki (1986) compares the eciency of vertical and horizontal informa-
tion structures. Dewan and Myatt (2008) study the role of leadership and leader's communication
skills in the standard adaptation and coordination problem. Brunnermeier, Bolton, and Veldkamp
(2013) add a new issue related to coordination between members' and leader's decisions to the stan-
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dard model. However, these studies do not consider the case in which members' incentives are not
aligned to maximizing organizational performances and communication is strategic. Furthermore,
our paper indicates out that the optimal decision-making process is dierent between non-strategic
and strategic cases when ex-ante conict is serious.
The extensive literature on strategic communication has analyzed strategic information trans-
mission among self-interested parties with conicting interest. Crawford and Sobel (1982) is a
seminal work in this eld. They considered a situation in which only a sender can observe the
true state, but only a receiver can make a decision that aects both the sender's and receiver's
utilities. They show that there is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that state spaces are divided
by nite numbers of partitions, and the sender reveals only the partition in which the true state is
as long as the parties never have the same preference in the decision. We model the communication
game as more simple and more tractable than the traditional model developed by Craword and
Sobel (1982). As done by Alonso, Dessein, and Matouchek (2008), we avoid the integer problem,
which is associated with the nite-partition equilibrium in the traditional model, by focusing on the
equilibrium with innite-partition equilibrium. For innite-partition equilibrium to be feasible, we
assume that such ex-ante conict between two followers is not too strong. This assumption ensures
that each follower has an identical preference as the other follower in the sense of his expectation
with strictly positive probability.
Some recent papers consider an adaptation and coordination model with strategic communi-
cation. Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) consider an authority allocation problem in such
situation. Rantakari (2008) considers a situation in which heterogeneous importance of adaptation
and coordination exists within divisions. We consider a dierent aspect of coordination, that is, co-
ordination between members' and an organizational decisions, and address the issue on leadership.
This study has a similar characteristics with researches on multi-sender situations with independent
preference of senders, for example, Kawamura (2011), McGee and Yang (2013), and Ogawa (2013).
As studied in Ogawa (2013), this study considers the case in which there exist ex-ante conict
among followers in the sense that expected ideal decisions of theirs is dierent and also assumes
that the ex-ante conict is not strong to ensure that innite-partition strategy is feasible.
In leadership literature, taking initiatives is considered as one of the central roles of leaders.
Hermalin (1998) considers the free-rider problem in a team and shows that a leader can moderate
the problem by being the rst to make s decision.
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3 Model
We study the organization in which there is one leader (she) and two followers (he) indexed by
i. Follower i has two concerns ; 1) minimizing the dierence between his decision di and his
environment i + bi (i's ideal point or ideal decision) and 2) minimizing the dierence between di
and an organizational decision d. In particular, we specify that his prot function i is composed
of two quadratic-loss function:
i =  k(di   i   bi)2   (di   d)2;
where k 2 R+ indexes the importance of local adaptation and  2 R+ indexes the importance of
coordination between local decisions and an organizational direction. Because the relative sizes of k
and  are of signicant, we assume k+  = 1. The leader decides d to maximizes the organizational
performance  dened by the sum of both followers' prots;
 = 1 + 2:
Each follower's objective is to maximize only his own prot1 .
i is follower i's private information and is uniformly distributed in [ s; s] where s 2 R+, and
bi 2 R is public information. We assume  b1 = b2 = b > 0. This implies that the expected
followers' ideal points are symmetrical around zero, and we interpret b as the extent of ex-ante
conict with regard to the organizational decisions among the followers. If b = 0, the distribu-
tions of both followers' ideal points are identical, and the followers are most likely to have similar
preference regarding which organizational decision should be implemented. As b increases, the
overlapping ranges between both the distributions decrease and the followers are likely to have
dierent preference regarding the organizational decision.
The followers can communicate their own private information before the leader and the followers
make decisions. Each follower privately sends a one-time costless message ri 2 [ s; s] to the leader2.
We suppose that the leader cannot commit any mechanism and monetary transfer contingent on
messages, that is, any communication is cheap talk. We denote the belief on follower i's information
after communication as mi  E[ijri] for i = 1; 2. Finally, in order to make our model tractable,
we utilize the following assumption.
1In organizations, it is typically to undesirable to fully align a member's incentives from the viewpoint of preventing
a free-rider problem, even if a misalignment in their incentives creates communication problem. Athey and Roberts
(2001), Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2010), and Friebel and Raith (2007) address this issue.
2We will study the case in which the followers' messages are publicly observable in Discussion section.
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Assumption 1. b  s2 .
In words, the assumption suggests that the extent of the conict between the followers is not too
serious. As we see later, this assumption ensures that the partition-strategy with innite partitions
in the communication game is feasible.
Decision-making process and game ow
The leader can commit the timing of her making an organizational decision ex ante. The rst
opportunity to make a decision is before followers' decision-making.3 We term this decision-making
process as a "process with the leader's initiative", and we use "I" to index this. The leader does
make an organizational decision based on collected information through cheap talk communication.
In process I, the game proceeds in the following manner:
1. The followers privately observe i.
2. The followers send their messages to the leader (they are not necessarily truthful).
3. The leader decides d.
4. After observing d, the followers decide di.
The second opportunity of making an organizational decision is after decision-makings of the
followers. We term this decision-making process as a "process without the leader's initiative",
and we use "NI" to index this. The leader can observe the followers' decision and decide an
organizational decision based on not only received messages but also observed followers' decisions.
In process NI, the game proceeds in the following manner:
1. The followers privately observe i.
2. The followers send their messages to the leader (they are not necessarily truthful).
3. The followers decide di.
4. After observing (d1; d2), the leader decides d.
3We can show that making an organizational decision before communication yields a lower prot than the one
after communication.
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4 Decision-making and performance under process I
Here, we solve the problem backward. In the last stage, for given d, follower i's decision is given
by the convex combination of the organizational direction d and his ideal point i+ bi weighted by
k and ;
di = k(i + bi) + d:
It is important to make two remarks regarding the follower's decision policy. First, for each follower,
the preference of the other follower is not signicant in his decision-making. Then, the observability
of the other follower's message does not aect his decision. Second, the followers' decisions are
aligned toward maximizing the organizational performance for given d. Once d is determined, the
decision of each follower also maximizes the organizational performance. This implies that the
initiative by the leader makes each followers' incentives aligned toward global optimization, and if
she has complete knowledge of followers' information, the leader archives the highest performance
by setting d appropriately in process I.
Substituting di into i, i is represented as
i =  k(d  i   bi)2:
The product k captures the seriousness of the tradeo between adaptation and coordination. To
see this, suppose k is suciently low and  is high, that is, the followers have to pay little attention
to failures in adaptation and only care about failures in coordination. If the organizational decision
is greatly dierent from their own ideal points, the followers accommodate their decisions to the
organizational decision with a large weight and reduces dependency on their own ideal points.
As  goes to 1, the loss that comes from failures in adaptation becomes trivial then the followers
completely accommodate their decisions to the organizational decision. Thus, when  is close to one
(equivalently k is zero), k is close to zero and the trade-o problem becomes trivial. In contrast,
when delta and k are similar values such as 1=2, the trade-o problem becomes most serious. This
is also true if we replace  with k in the above discussion.
In the third stage, the leader makes the decision d to maximize organizational performance for
given the message (r1; r2). The leader's problem is represented as
max
d
 k
X
i=1;2
E[(d  i   bi)2jr1; r2]:
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The optimal decision is given by a mean of m1 and m2;
d =
m1 +m2
2
:
Using E[mii] = E[m
2
i ], the organizational performance is represented as
E[I ] =  k

2
3
s2   1
2
E[m21] 
1
2
E[m22] + 2b
2

:
In the remainder of this section, we identify the communication strategy when followers com-
municate strategically. While truth-telling equilibrium does not exist, partially informative com-
munication may still be achieved. The followers follow the partition-strategy such that they divide
the type-space into some intervals and reveal only the interval their types belong to. Precisely, for
i = 1; 2, follower i divide his type-space into Ni intervals and name cuto points from the left as aij ,
which satises boundary conditions ai0 =  si and aiNi = si and order constraints aij < aij+1 for
j = 0; :::; Ni. In equilibrium, follower i sends a randomized message that is drawn from the uniform
distribution supported on [aij 1; aij) if i 2 [aij 1; aij). If the receipt message is in [aij 1; aij), the
leader forms the posterior belief that mij =
aij 1+aij
2 . On each cuto point, follower i is indierent
between reporting that i belongs to either one of the two intervals around that cuto point. That
is, any cuto aij for j = 1; :::Ni   1 must satisfy the following indierent conditions,
E[iji = aij ;mi = mij ] = E[iji = aij ;mi = mij+1]: (1)
Solving and arranging this, we obtain the second order dierence equation in the following manner:
for j = 1; :::; Ni   1,
aij+1   aij = aij   aij 1 + 4aij   8bi: (2)
From the second order dierence equation (2), we can see how the size of each interval is determined.
The change in the size of the intervals becomes quite small when aij is near  2bi. Intuitively, if
i =  2bi, his ideal decision is  2bi + bi =  bi = b i. That is, his ideal decision equals the
expected value of the other follower's ideal decision, and follower i has an incentive to represent
correct information. On the other hand, at any cuto aij such that aij <  2bi, the size of the
interval aij+1  aij is smaller than the size of the preceding intervals aij   aij 1 by 4jaij +2bij, and
the changes in the sizes of intervals decrease as j increases. At any cuto aij such that aij >  2bi,
the size of the interval aij+1   aij is larger than the size of the preceding intervals aij   aij 1 by
4jaij + 2bij, and the changes in the sizes of intervals increase as j increases.
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As Crawford and Sobel (1982) remarked, the niteness of Ni does not hold if the follower has
identical preference (in the term of i's expectation) to the leader with strict positive probability,
and Assumption 1 ensures that this condition holds.
Lemma 1. If Assumption 1 holds, there is no upper bound for the number of equilibrium cutos.
The proof is in Appendix. The lemma is further intuitive. From (2), we can obtain the equilibrium
at which an innite number of intervals exist around  2bi with a negligibly small size. Assumption
1 ensures that  2bi 2 [ s; s], that is, such a type is in the range of i's type space4.
In summary, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. For i = 1; 2, there exists a positive integer Ni and
at least one equilibrium such that;
1. follower i sends the randomized message ri, which is drawn from the uniform distribution
supported on [aij 1; aij) if i 2 [aij 1; aij) for j = 1; :::Ni   1 and on [aiNi 1; aiNi ] if i 2
[aiNi 1; aiNi ],
2. the leader makes her belief mi as
aij 1+aij
2 if ri is in [aij 1; aij) for j = 1; :::Ni   1 and
aiNi 1+aiNi
2 if the receipt message ri is in [aiNi 1; aiNi ], and
3. for j = 1; :::; Ni   1, aij follows (2), and ai0 =  si and aiNi = si.
4. dIi = k(i + bi) + d
I , and
5. dI = m1+m22 .
It must be noted that, when communication is strategic the leader's decision is almost always
inecient ex post, that is, d 6= d1+d22 . In process I, it can be ecient only when 1+ 2 = m1+m2
holds. This implies that the leader has incentive to reverse her decision after observing the followers'
decisions if possible. We examine the possibility of decision-making after observation in the next
section.
A residual variance E[(i mi)2] indicates how the information that follower i provides is precise
on average. If the updated posterior belief of the leader regarding i's information is close to (resp.
far from) his actual one, it becomes small (resp. large). By applying the law of iterated expectation,
4Then, our model shares a consistent character to the classical Crawford-Sobel model in the sense that the large
conict parameter "b" makes the upper bound of the number of partitions small.
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we obtain E[(i mi)2] = E[2i ] E[m2i ]. Because E[2i ] is independent of the equilibrium prole and
the residual variance decreases as E[m2i ] goes up, we refer to E[m
2
i ] as the quality of communication
with follower i.
The quality of communication with follower i increases as Ni goes up, that is, the more the
intervals, the more precise the communication.
Lemma 2. E[m2i ] is increasing in Ni.
Proof is in Appendix. A higher quality of communication also improves organizational performance.
Therefore, in the following section we focus on the equilibrium with an innite-partition strategy,
in which the organizational performance is maximized within any partition-strategy equilibrium.
The quality of communication with innite partitions is given by
lim
Ni!1
E[m2i ] =
2
7
s2   4
7
b2:
We remark that the quality of communication decreases as b2 increases. The intuition is as follows.
For minimizing the residual variance, the size of the largest interval should be decreased even if the
size of smaller intervals increase. Since the size of the interval increases as the cuto is far from
 2bi, the size of the largest interval is minimized when bi = 05.
When N1 and N2 is suciently large, the expected performance is approximately represented
as
E[I ] =  8k
21
s2   18k
7
b2: (3)
5 Decision-making and performance in process NI
In process NI, the leader pushes o her decision after the followers make decisions. The leader can
access not only the messages but also observed followers' decisions in her decision-making.
We solve the problem backward. In the last stage the leader solves the following problem; for
given (d1; d2) and (r1; r2),
max
d
2X
i=1
E
 k(di   i   bi)2   (d  di)2jr1; r2 :
Clearly, the optimal organizational decision is dependent only on the observed followers' decisions,
not on their messages. This implies that communication is no use under process NI and any
5For more details, see Lemma 3 in Ogawa(2013).
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communication strategy is indierent.6 Then, the leader makes the organizational decision as a
simple mean of d1 and d2 such as
d =
d1 + d2
2
:
Substituting d into follower i's objective function and rearranging it, i's problem in the third
stage can be represented as
max
di
E

 k(di   i   bi)2   
4
(di   d i)2

:
Then, if we set b = 0, the problem coincides with the standard adaptation and coordination
problem, studied by Dessein and Santos (2006), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008), and
Rantakari (2008).
From the rst order condition, we obtain
di =
4k
1 + 3k
(i + bi) +

1 + 3k
E[d i]:
It must be noted that the followers' decisions are distorted from the ecient level in the sense that
they place excessive weight on their own ideal points. For the given information set of follower i,
the rst order condition of the total prot maximizing problem shows that i's decision must satisfy
di =
2k
1 + k
(i + bi) +

1 + k
E[d j ]:
A comparison of ecient decision with equilibrium decision reveals that each follower's local decision
is made with excessively high weight on i + bi (i.e.,
4k
1+3k  2k1+k ) and low weight on E[d i] (i.e.,

1+3k  1+k ). We call this distortion excessive adaptation. Excessive adaptation does pay for i
because the future organizational decision moves toward i + bi by one half unit if he moves his
decision toward i + bi by one unit. It also has to be noted that excessive adaptation can occur
even when both followers have identical preferences ex post as long as messages are not publicly
observable. The exact decision one follower makes is (almost) always dierent from the expected
decision another follower considers.
After repeated substitution, we obtain
dNIi =
4k
1 + 3k
i +
2k
1 + k
bi;
and
E[NI ] =  2k(1 + 7k)
3(1 + 3k)2
s2   2k(1 + 3k)
(1 + k)2
b2:
6Communication is meaningful if messages are observable to the other follower. See Discussion section.
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6 Performance comparison
In this section, we evaluate the value of the leader's initiative by comparing the performances
between processes I and NI. Constraints on information transmission determine the value of the
initiative. If the leader has access to adequate information, the leader's initiative is valuable. Tak-
ing the initiative, the leader enable the followers to become aligned to maximizing organizational
performance, and the leader can achieve the highest performance if there is no asymmetric infor-
mation. However, if information transmission is restricted, process NI can have an advantage over
process I. While taking no initiative makes the followers' decisions distorted, the leader does not
need to rely on restricted communication and the leader's decision is optimal in the ex-post sense.
6.1 Non-strategic communication case
To describe how constraints on information transmission aect relative performances, we rst con-
sider the non-strategic communication case. In this case, followers provide truthful messages but
miscommunication occurs with probability  exogenously determined. If miscommunication occurs,
the leader unconsciously receives a wrong message ri which is drawn from the uniform distribution
on [ s; s] independent of the original message. We use "nsI" to index the no-strategic case and
represent the organizational performance in this case as nsI . Process NI is superior to nsI if and
only if NI  nsI  0, or equally,
1  (1  )2
2
+
(9   10)
2(4  3)2

s2
3
  (1  )
(2  )2 b
2  0:
We obtain the following relationship from the above condition.
Proposition 2. Suppose communication is not strategic and miscommunication occurs with . The
organizational performance without the leader's initiative is larger (smaller) than the organizational
performance with it if (i)  is large (small), (ii)  is close to zero (one), and (iii) b2 is small (large).
The proof is in Appendix.
First, process NI is likely to dominate process nsI when  is large. If miscommunication never
occurs (i.e.,  = 0), it is evident that process NI is dominated by process nsI because the leader can
achieves the highest performance. However, if some noise can be contained (i.e.,  > 0), process
NI may be superior due to the risk of miscommunication and to making a wrong organizational
decision. It is remarkable that even when  = 1, it can be the case that process NI may be
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dominated by process nsI if  is suciently large. In process nsI, although the leader has no
available information and then always sets d = 0 when  = 1, her initiative relieves the followers'
incentives for excessive adaptation. Second, process NI achieves higher performance than process
nsI when  is small. As  become small, the loss from excessive adaptation (it implies worse
coordination) in process NI becomes small. Third, large b2 enhances the relative advantage of
process nsI. As b2 increases, the extent of the distortion in the followers' decisions becomes large.
The marginal loss from miscommunication in process I is not so much as in process NI.
In gure 1, we demonstrate the threshold of  with  = 1=3; 1=2; 17. In the left area of the
threshold, the performance in process NI is higher than the one in process nsI, and vice versa in the
right area. Moreover, the area in which NI dominates nsI shrinks as b2 increases and  decreases.
0
b2

s2=4
1
 = 1=3  = 1=2  = 1
Process I
Process NI
Figure 6: The thresholds when communication is non-strategic
6.2 Strategic communication case
Next, we make a comparison of performances under process NI with I in a strategic communication
case. In this regard, we make the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose communication is strategic. The organizational performance without the
leader's initiative is better (worse) than the performance with it if (i)  is close to zero (one) and
(ii) b2 is large (small).
Proof is in Appendix.
While the result and the intuition of the comparative statics with  is the same as in the
non-strategic case, we obtain a contrary result in the comparative statics with b2. The relative
7Remark that process NI is dominated by process nsI for any  and b2 when  = 0. This is because the leader
archives the highest performance in process I if there exist no constraint on information transmission.
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performance of process I over NI is decreasing in b2. This is explained by an interaction between
ex-ante conict and the precision of communication. In the strategic case, the risk of miscommuni-
cation is endogenous, and the quality of communication becomes worse as b2 increases. Then, the
total marginal loss by increasing b2 in the strategic case is larger than in the non-strategic case,
and it is larger than the marginal caused by excessive adaptation.
In gure 2, the curve on the left side is the threshold in the strategic case. Contrary to the
non-strategic case, the area in which NI dominates I expands as b2 increases.
10
s2
2
Without horizontal communication

b2
Process IProcess NI
With horizontal communication
Figure 7: The thresholds when communication is strategic
7 Discussion; observability and timing of decision-making
7.1 Horizontal communication
In this subsection, we relax the assumption on unobservable messages and assume that followers'
messages are publicly observable. We can interpret this scenario to imply that the followers can
communicate horizontally, as Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008) studied
in the decentralization case. We index the new process as process NI-HC. While this relaxation
does not aect the performance in process I, it makes communication valuable and can improve the
performance in process NI because communication enable followers to deduce the others' decisions.
In this scenario, follower i's problem in the third stage in process NI-HC is represented as
follows;
max
di
E

 k(di   i   bi)2   
4
(di   d i)2jr1; r2

:
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From the rst order condition, we obtain
di =
4k
1 + 3k
(j + bi) +

1 + 3k
E[d j jr1; r2]:
The follower's decision is dependent on the belief (m1;m2) even when the leader does not take
initiative. By repeated substitution, we obtain
di =
4k
1 + 3k
i +
2
2(1 + k)(1 + 3k)
mi +

2(1 + k)
m i +
2k
1 + k
bi:
It is also evident that the incentives for excessive adaptation remain. The ecient decision
policy for given (r1; r2) is
di =
2k
1 + k
(i + bi) +

1 + k
E[d j jr1; r2]:
Then, the followers also have incentive for excessive adaptation even if messages are publicly ob-
servable.
As done in the previous section, we compare organizational performance between the two pro-
cesses. Then, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose messages are publicly observable. The organizational performance without
the leader's initiative is better (worse) than the organizational performance with it if  is close to
zero (one).
The proof is in Appendix. The threshold is depicted in Figure 2. If messages are publicly
observable, the area where process NI is superior should expand. Although the intuition is almost
the same as that in propositions 2 and 3, the result of comparative statics with b should be slightly
dierent. Because communication precision becomes worse in both process as b increases, the
relative organizational performance in process NI as compared to process I worsen as b becomes
large. Nevertheless, we can graphically check that the same property claimed in Proposition 3 is
preserved.
7.2 Communication vs Observation
There exist two critical dierences in between process I and NI. The rst one is in the timing of
the decision-making and the second one is in the manner how the leader obtain the knowledge of
which organizational decision is ecient: through communication or observation. The aim of this
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subsection is to distinguish between two and study how the dierence in the second aspect aects
the results.
As long as the leader makes a commitment to not observe followers' decisions, communication
is signicant even if the leader makes a decision after the followers do. The leader's decision is
given by
d =
E[d1jr1; r2] + E[d2jr1; r2]
2
:
Then the leader's decision policy is dierent from the one in processes NI and NI-HC. The leader
forms beliefs regarding the decisions of the followers and makes an organizational decision relying
on the belief.
The leader can eliminate the followers' incentive for excessive adaptation without relying on
observation in her decision-making. The followers' decision is represented as
di = k(i + bi) + E[djri]:
Then, for the given information set of follower i, i's decision also maximizes expected organizational
performance. On the other hand, also as in process I, the demerit of not relying on observation is
that the information the leader can access is limited due to intentional communication noise.
As done in the previous section, we compare the performance between two processes. We obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. If the leader makes an organizational decision after the followers, commitment to
not observing the followers' decisions improve (worsen) the organizational performance when  is
close to zero (one).
The proof is in Appendix. The proposition implies that the positive side of the leader's initia-
tive is associated with communication-based decision-making. The communication-based decision-
making process eliminates the followers' self-interested incentives and realizes better coordination
than the observation-based decision-making process.
8 Concluding remarks
We studied the value of a leader's initiative in the modied adaptation and coordination problem.
The merit of the leader's initiative is aligning the followers' incentives to the interest of the or-
ganization. Once the leader makes an organizational decision, there is no room for the followers
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to manipulate the organizational decision in their own favor after that. Indeed, if transmitted
information from the followers does not include any noise, the leader's decision is ecient and
organizational performance is the best. However, constraints on information transmission reduce
the value of the initiative. In particular, the loss from miscommunication becomes serious when
the importance of coordination relative to adaptation is large. We showed that organizational per-
formance without the leader's initiative is better than the performance with the leader's initiative
when coordination is important. The result is robust even when we change the assumption on ob-
servability of messages. We also discuss that the superiority of the leader's initiative originates from
the communication-based decision-making process, rather than the timing of decision-making, and
we showed that even if the leader makes a decision after the followers, organizational performance
can be improved by committing to not observe the followers' decisions.
Some extensions of this study remained to be explored. One important extension is considering
the coordination needs between both followers' decisions. If we add that coordination term into the
followers' objective function, the extended model is similar to the model studied in Brunnermeier,
Bolton, and Veldkamp (2013), excepting the assumption on the local environment followers face.8
While they study the role of leadership in the extended adaptation and coordination problem
when direct communication from a follower to a leader or the other followers is impossible, our
result provide a framework that allows us to study their model in a strategic or non-strategic
communication case. We conjecture that our result is preserved, that is, the leader's commitment
for not observing followers' decisions may improve organizational performance, because the followers
potentially have incentives for excessive adaptation as long as the leader observes their decisions.
Introducing biases into the followers' compensation contract is also an important extension. As
one follower also takes care of an other follower's prot, not only his own prot, the performance
in both decision-making processes would improve. Indeed, it is almost certain that the quality of
communication would improve when the leader takes an initiative and the follower's incentive for
excessive adaptation becomes mild when the leader does not take an initiative. However, it is not
clear whether the relative superiority of the leader's initiative becomes strong or weak as the bias
changes.
8While local environments are dierent and independent in our model, it is common in their model.
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Appendix
Derivation of communication strategy
For the later proofs, we derive the equilibrium communication strategy by a general form. Since
follower i's decision can be represented as linear combination of (i;mi;m i; bi), we can represent
follower i's interim expected prot E[iji; ri] as E[iji; ri] = Aim2i +Bimii +Cimibi + Fi where
Fi is terms independent of mi (also note that E[m ijri] = E[ i] = 0). Then, we can rewrite (1)
as follows;
Ai(m
2
ij+1  m2ij) +Bi(mij+1  mij)i + Ci(mij+1  mij)bi = 0
! 2(mij+1 +mij) =  2B
A
i   2C
A
bi:
Substituting mij =
aij+1+aij
2 and i = aij yields that
aij+1   aij = aij   aij 1  

2Bi
Ai
+ 4

aij   2Ci
Ai
bi: (4)
For given Ni, together with the boundary conditions ai0 =  s and aiNi = s, (4) yields a following
explicit form of equilibrium cutos as follows;
aij =
xji   yji
xNii   yNii
(s  q(bi)) + x
Ni j
i   yNi ji
xNii   yNii
( s  q(bi)) + q(bi); (5)
where
xi =  1  Bi
Ai
+
s
1 +
Bi
Ai
2
  1 (6)
yi =  1  Bi
Ai
 
s
1 +
Bi
Ai
2
  1 (7)
q(bi) =   Ci
2Ai +BI
bi: (8)
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Derivation of E[m2i ]
After some lengthy calculation, we obtain
E[m2i ] =
Ni 1X
j=0
Z aij+1
aij

aij+1 + aij
2
2 1
2s
di
=
1
8s
Ni 1X
j=0
 
a3ij+1 + a
2
ij+1aij   aij+1a2ij   a3ij

=
1
4
x2i + 2xi + 1
x2i + xi + 1
s2   1
4
x2i   2xi + 1
x2i + xi + 1
q(bi)
2
 1
4
(x2i   1)2(xNii (xNii   1)2(s2   q(bi)2) + 4x2Nii s2)
xi(x2i + xi + 1)(x
Ni
i + 1)
2(xNii   1)2
(9)
As Ni goes to innity, it converges to
lim
Ni!1
E[m2i ] =
1
4
x2i + 2xi + 1
x2i + xi + 1
s2   1
4
x2i   2xi + 1
x2i + xi + 1
q(bi)
2: (10)
Proof of Lemma 1
We show that faijgj=0;1;:::Ni satisfy the boundary constraint (that is, ai0 =  s and aiNi = s) and
the order constraint (that is, aij is strictly increasing in j) for any Ni if  s  q(bi)  s. It is
straight forward to check that faijgj=0;1;:::Ni satisfy the boundary constraints for any Ni.
We can show that faijgj=0;1;:::Ni satisfy the order constraints as follows. Since xi > 1 and
0 < yi < 1, the coecient of the rst term in (5) is increasing in j and the coecient of the second
term in (5) is decreasing in j. For any Ni, the rst term of (5) is not decreasing in j if s  q(bi)
and strictly increasing in j if s > q(bi). For any Ni, the second term of (5) is not decreasing in
j if  s  q(bi) and strictly increasing in j if  s < q(bi). Thus, if  s  q(bi)  s, aij is strictly
increasing in j.
Proof of Lemma 2
The third term of (9) is strictly positive and decreasing in Ni if Assumption 1 holds and xi > 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We rst derive the performance under I in non-strategic communication case. Because the leader's
decision is given by
d = (1  )r1 + r2
2
;
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follower i's expected prot is given by
E[nsIi ] =  (1  )E
"
k

(1  )i +  i
2
  i   bi
2#
  E
24k (1  ) ~i +  i
2
  i   bi
!235
=  (1  )k

(1 + )2 + (1  )2
4
s2
3
+ b2

  k

(1  )2
2
+ 1

s2
3
+ b2
2
=  k

(1 + )2
2
  2

s2
3
+ b2

where ~i is independent of i and uniformly distributed on [ s; s]. Then,
E[nsI ] =  k

(1 + )2
2
  2

2s2
3
+ 2b2

:
Then, NI is superior to nsI if and only if NI  nsI  0, or equally,
1  (1  )2
2
+
(9   10)
2(4  3)2

2s2
3
  2(1  )
(2  )2 b
2  0:
The proposition follows from the above condition.
Proof of Proposition 3
We rst derive the performance in process I in strategic communication case. Follower i's expected
prot is given by
E[Ii ] =  E
"
k

mi +m i
2
  i   bi
2#
=  

s2
3
+ b2   3
4
E[m2i ] +
1
4
E[m2 i]

:
Here we use the fact E[imi] = E[E[imijri]] = E[m2i ] and E[mi] = E[m i] = 0. Follower i's
interim expected prot is given by
E[Ii jri; i] =  k

2i + b
2   1
4
m2i  mii  mib

+Gi;
where Gi is terms independent of mi. Then, substituting Ai = 1=4, Bi = Ci =  1 into (10), we
obtain that
lim
Ni!1
E[m2i ] =
2
7
s2   4
7
b2:
Process NI is superior to process I if and only if NI  I  0, or equally,
362   47 + 8
3(4  3)2 s
2 +
92   15 + 8
(2  )2 b
2  0:
The proposition follows from the above condition.
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Proof of Proposition 4
We rst derive the performance in process NI when messages are publicly observable. From the
rst order condition of the follower i's problem and repeated substitution, we obtain
dNI HCi =
4k
1 + 3k
i +
2
2(1 + k)(1 + 3k)
mi +

2(1 + k)
m i +
2k
1 + k
bi:
After some arrangement, we obtain the organizational performance as follows;
E[NI HC ] =
2k(1 + 7k)
3(1 + 3k)2
s2 +
2k(1 + 3k)
(1 + k)2
b2   k
2(13k2 + 10k + 1)
2(1 + k)2(1 + 3k)2
(E[m21] + E[m
2
2]):
Follower i's interim expected prot is given by
E[NI HCi jri; i] =  
k3
4(1 + k)2(1 + 3k)
m2i +
k2
(1 + k)(1 + 3k)
mii +
k2
(1 + k)2
mibi +Hi
where Hi is terms independent of mi. Then, substituting Ai =
k3
4(1+k)2(1+3k)
, Bi =   k2(1+k)(1+3k)
Ci =   k2(1+k)2 into (10), we obtain that
lim
Ni!1
E[m2i ] =
2(1 + k)
7 + 9k
s2   4(1 + 3k)
7 + 9k
b2:
The equilibrium cutos are represented by the following equation.
aij+1   aij = aij   aij 1 + 41 + 3k
1  k aij + 8
1 + 3k
1  k bi;
Finally, we compare the performance of process NI-HC and process I. E[NI HC ] E[I ]  0
if and only if
2(542   103 + 32)
3
s2   243
3   1100 + 1456   512
2   b
2  0:
The proposition follows from the above condition.
Proof of Proposition 5
We rst derive the equilibrium decision in process NI'. Note that E[d] = E[d1]+E[d2]2 and E[di] =
kbi + E[d]. Then, repeated substitution yields that E[d] = 0 and E[di] = kbi. By the low of
iterated expectation, for i = 1; 2 we obtain
E[djri] = E[d1jri] + E[d2jri]
2
=
E[dijri] + kb i
2
: (11)
60
Because
E[dijri] = k(mi + bi) + E[djri]; (12)
repeated substitution yields that
E[dijri] = 2k
1 + k
mi + kbi:
Then, we obtain
dNI
0
i = k(i + bi) +
k
1 + k
mi:
After some arrangement, we obtain the organizational performance as follows;
E[NI
0
] =  2k

s2
3
+ b2

+
k2
1 + k
(E[m21] + E[m
2
2]):
Next, we derive the communication strategy. Follower i's interim expected prot is given by
E[NI
0
i jri; i] =  
k3
(1 + k)2
m2i +
2k2
(1 + k)
mii +
2k2
(1 + k)
mibi + Ii
where Ii is terms independent ofmi. Then, substituting Ai =
k3
(1+k)2
, Bi =   2k2(1+k) , and Ci =   2k
2
(1+k)
into (10), we obtain that
lim
Ni!1
E[m2i ] =
1 + k
3k + 4
s2   (1 + k)
2
3k + 4
b2:
The equilibrium cutos are represented by the following equation.
aij+1   aij = aij   aij 1 + 41
k
aij + 4
1 + k
k
bi;
Finally, we compare the performance of NI and NI'. E[NI ]  E[NI0 ]  0 if and only if
8  15
3(4  3)2 s
2   
3   92 + 19   8
(2  )2 b
2  0:
The proposition follows from the above condition.
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Chapter 4.
Task Assignment under Agent Loss Aversion 1
1 Introduction
Assigning a task to an appropriate employee is a major determinant of rm performance. Such
a task assignment can be even more important when the task requires a dierent skill depending
on the situation. According to contract theory, in the absence of asymmetric-information problem,
a principal (she) oers a contingent contract where she assigns a task to an agent (he) whose
productivity is the highest in each situation. In working environments, however, a task is often
assigned to a single agent regardless of the situation even if such a contingent contract is available.
We investigate this issue by incorporating a prominent behavioral aspect, loss aversion: people
are more sensitive to losses than to same-sized gains. In our model, the principal assigns a task
to one of two agents in each state. Each agent's productivity level varies across states, whereas
his eort-cost function is the same across states. The principal writes a contract that species the
wages of the agents, which agent works on the task, and his eort level depending on the state.
The agents are expectation-based loss averse a la K}oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007): the utility of
each agent depends not only on intrinsic material payos but also on psychological gain-loss payos
from comparing his realized outcome with his expected outcomes.
If agents are not loss averse, then in each state the principal always assigns the task to the agent
with the highest productivity. In contrast, if agents are loss averse, then the principal may assign
the task to a single agent in all states based on the trade-o between improving productivity and
alleviating expected losses. On one hand, such a contract is less ecient in terms of productivity
because a less productive agent works in some state. On the other hand, it reduces the principal's
wage payment by alleviating the expected losses of the agent. If the latter eect outweighs the
former, assigning the task to a single agent in all states becomes optimal. In addition, when the
degree of loss aversion is large, the optimal contract species the same eort levels in all states.
This result is in sharp contrast with the standard concave-utility case where the principal species
state-specic eort levels as long as the productivities of the agents are dierent.2
1This chapter is joint work with Kohei Daido, Kimiyuki Morita, and Takeshi Murooka, and published in Economics
Letters 121.1 (2013): 35-38. (DOI link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.040)
2As related literature, Heidhues and K}oszegi (2005, 2008) and Herweg and Mierendor (2013) analyze the opti-
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes
the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Suppose one risk- and loss-neutral principal assigns a task to one of two agents. All of them are
uncertain about the future state at the contracting stage. There are two states, s = 1; 2, and one of
the states is realized after contracting. State 1 (resp. state 2) is realized with probability q 2 (0; 1)
(resp. 1   q). The value of the task depends on the state, and the principal can write a contract
contingent on the state. Agent i = A;B works on the task if and only if the principal assigns the
task to him, and only one agent can work on the task in each state. The agent in charge of the task
exerts eort e 2 R+ with eort cost c(e) = e2=2. If agent A (resp. agent B) is assigned to the task
in state s 2 f1; 2g and exerts eort eAs (resp. eBs ), the principal earns seAs (resp. seBs ) from the
task. Assume that 1 > 1, and 2 < 2: the productivity of agent A is higher (resp. lower) than
that of agent B in state 1 (resp. state 2). For brevity, we further assume that 1 = 2 = 1 and
q1 + (1  q)2 > 1: agent B's productivity is constant across states and the average productivity
of agent A is higher than that of agent B.3
Since our focus is not on moral hazard issues, we consider a case in which the eort level is
contractible in each state.4 The principal oers a contract that species a wage scheme to each
agent depending on the state w = (wA1 ; w
A
2 ; w
B
1 ; w
B
2 ), the eort level in each state e = (e1; e2), and
which agent works on the task contingent on the state.5 The states in which agent A works on the
task are denoted by D 2 D  f?; f1g; f2g; f1; 2gg. For example, D = f1g means agent A works in
state 1 but agent B works in state 2. The contract is denoted by C(w; e;D) 2 R4 R2+ D. Each
agent accepts the contract if his expected utility is larger than or equal to his reservation utility,
which is assumed to be zero. We call a task assignment is state-independent if the principal assigns
the task to a single agent in both states; otherwise it is state-dependent. The timing is as follows:
1. The principal oers a contract to agents.
mality of state-independent pricing under consumer loss aversion.
3Our main results hold without imposing these specications. See Daido et al. (2013) for general analysis.
4See, for example, Gill and Stone (2010) and Herweg et al. (2010) for analysis on moral-hazard problems under
agent loss aversion.
5Note that in each state an agent who is not in charge of the task exerts zero eort.
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2. Each agent chooses whether to accept the contract.
3. The state is realized.
4. The task assignment, the eort provision, and the payment are carried out according to the
contract.
2.2 Reference-Dependent Preferences
A key assumption of our model is that each agent's overall utility comprises intrinsic consump-
tion payos and psychological gain-loss payos. We assume that each agent has expectation-based
reference-dependent preferences a la K}oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). In our model, the agents
have two consumption dimensions: wage and eort. For each consumption dimension, they feel a
psychological gain or loss by comparing a realized outcome with a reference outcome. For deter-
ministic reference points, we denote each agent's reference point for his wage and eort cost by w^
and e^, respectively. If his actual wage and eort are w and e, then his overall utility is given by:
w   c(e) + (w   w^) + ( c(e) + c(e^));
where () is a gain-loss function that corresponds to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) value func-
tion. We assume that () is piecewise linear to focus on the eect of loss aversion. Then, we can
simply dene the gain-loss function when consumption is x and the reference point is r as
(x  r) =
(
x  r if x  r  0,
(x  r) if x  r < 0.
where   1 represents the degree of loss aversion.6 The agent is loss-neutral when  = 1.
Following K}oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that the reference point is determined
by rational beliefs on outcomes and that the reference point itself is stochastic if the outcome is
stochastic. Each agent feels a gain-loss by comparing every possible outcome with every reference
point. For example, suppose that the principal assigns the task to agent i in s = 1 but not in s = 2
with paying a constant wage wi. Then, agent i expects to incur eort cost c(e1) with probability
q and not to incur it with probability 1   q. If s = 1 is realized, then agent i incurs c(e1) and
hence he feels no gain-loss with probability q and feels a loss by c(e1) with probability 1   q. If
s = 2 is realized, then agent i does not incur the eort cost and hence he feels a gain by c(e1) with
6We set the weight of the gain-loss payos in K}oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), , is equal to one. Under the
solution concept of this paper,  can be normalized to one without loss of generality.
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probability q and feels no gain-loss with probability 1  q. Ex-ante the agent correctly anticipates
all the above cases, and his expected gain-loss utility in the eort dimension is  q(1 q)( 1)c(e1).
The expected gain-loss utility in the wage dimension is zero because the agent anticipates wi and
actually receives it.
We derive the optimal contract based on the choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE)
dened by K}oszegi and Rabin (2007). Intuitively, each agent knows that his beliefs will be adapted
to his accepted contract before he actually chooses his action, and hence he takes this change into
account when accepting a contract. Formally, given C(w; e;D) let 1is be the indicator function that
takes a value of one if agent i incurs an eort cost in state s and takes zero otherwise. Because agent
i's accepted contract itself determines his reference points, the condition for accepting a contract
C(w; e;D) under CPE is represented by U i(w; e;Djw; e;D)  0, or equivalently,
qwi1 + (1  q)wi2   1i1qc(e1)  1i2(1  q)c(e2)| {z }
intrinsic utility
  q(1  q)(  1)  jwi1   wi2j+ j1i1c(e1)  1i2c(e2)j| {z }
gain-loss utility
 0:
(CPE-IR)
Condition (CPE-IR) means that the agent's utility when he expected to accept the contract and
actually does so is no less than when he expected to decline the contract and actually does so.
3 Analysis
3.1 The Optimal Contract under Concave Utility
First, as a benchmark we study a case in which agents have concave utility and are not loss averse.
Suppose the agents have concave utility for wages which is separable from the eort cost, u(w) c(e).
Let u() be strictly increasing, concave, and u(0) = 0. Note that in the optimal contract Condition
(CPE-IR) holds with equality. The principal oers a constant wage to each agent due to the
concavity of u(). Because the principal's maximization problem is state-separable, she assigns the
task to the agent with the highest productivity in each state. These considerations lead to the
following result:
Result 1. Suppose agents have concave utility and are loss-neutral. Then, the state-dependent
contract C( w; e; f1g) where wA1 = wA2 = u 1(qc(e1)), wB1 = wB2 = u 1((1   q)c(e2)), e1 =
argmaxe1 q1e1   u 1(qc(e1)), and e2 = argmaxe2(1  q)e2   u 1((1  q)c(e2)) is optimal.
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Because an agent who works on the task is determined to maximize the social surplus in each state,
state-independent contracts are never optimal when agents are not loss averse.7 Further, the eort
levels specied in the optimal contract vary across states because the agents' productivity levels
depend on the state; even if agent A were to work on the task in both states, the principal would
still specify state-specic eort levels.
3.2 The Optimal Contract under Loss Aversion
Next, we examine the case where agents are loss averse. Since the agents are loss averse to wage
uncertainty, we can show that each agent obtains a constant wage across states in the optimal con-
tract. We denote the constant wage by wis = w
i. In addition, given our setting it is straightforward
to show that contracts with D = f?g and D = f2g are strictly dominated under any parameters.
Hence, we restrict the attention to contracts with D = f1g and D = f1; 2g.8
Given a task-assignment scheme D, the expected utility of agent A if he accepts contract
C(w; e;D) becomes
UA(w; e; f1gjw; e; f1g) = wA   q e
2
1
2
  q(1  q)(  1)e
2
1
2
;
UA(w; e; f1; 2gjw; e; f1; 2g) = wA   q e
2
1
2
  (1  q)e
2
2
2
  q(1  q)(  1) je
2
1   e22j
2
:
The expected utility of agent B can be described in the same manner. Note that Condition
(CPE-IR) holds with equality in the optimal contract. We denote the optimal wage by w(D) with
abbreviating the notations to w(f1g) = w1 and w(f1; 2g) = w12. By substituting each optimal
wage, the principal's payo function in each task-assignment scheme is represented by
(w1; e; f1g) = q1e1 + (1  q)e2   q
e21
2
  (1  q)e
2
2
2
  q(1  q)(  1)e
2
1
2
  q(1  q)(  1)e
2
2
2
;
(w12; e; f1; 2g) = q1e1 + (1  q)2e2   q
e21
2
  (1  q)e
2
2
2
  q(1  q)(  1) je
2
1   e22j
2
:
By solving the principal's problem in each case, we derive the optimal eort levels:
Lemma 1. Suppose agents are loss averse. Let  = 1+q(1 2)2+q(1 2) .
(i) Given D = f1; 2g, if  <  the optimal eort levels are 2 < e2(w12) < e1(w12) < 1 where
e1(w12) =
1
1+(1 q)( 1) and e

2(w

12) =
2
1 q( 1) ; if    the optimal eort levels are e1(w12) =
e2(w12) = q1 + (1  q)2.
7Note that a state-dependent task assignment, D = f1g, is optimal even when agents have concave consumption
utility with a unitary consumption dimension, u(w  c(e)). In this case, however, the optimal wages are not constant
across states; each agent obtains a positive wage if and only if he actually works on the task.
8See Daido et al. (2013) for a detailed derivation.
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(ii) Given D = f1g, the optimal eort levels are e1(w1) = 11+(1 q)( 1) < 1 and e2(w1) =
1
1+q( 1) < 1.
Proof. (i) It is straightforward to show that e1(w

12) < e2(w

12) is never optimal. Suppose e1(w

12) 
e2(w

12). If   1 + 1q , then the principal's payo is increasing in e2; hence e1(w12) = e2(w12) =
q1+ (1  q)2. If  < 1+ 1q , the rst-order condition yields e1(w12) = 11+(1 q)( 1) and e2(w12) =
2
1 q( 1) . Note that
1
1+(1 q)( 1) >
2
1 q( 1) if and only if  < . Because 1 +
1
q    > 0, the
principal species the same eort levels if and only if   . (ii) The optimal eort levels are
derived from the rst-order conditions of the principal's payo.
Lemma 1 (i) shows that if the principal assigns the task to agent A in both states, then the
dierence between state-specic eort levels reduces as the degree of loss aversion increases. Note
that optimal eort levels are given by e1 = 1 and e1 = 2 if agents are loss neutral; e

1(w

12) moves
downward from 1 and e

2(w

12) moves upward from 2 as  increases. Further, if  is larger than
or equal to , then e1(w12) coincides with e2(w12) at q1+ (1  q)2 and hence the agent does not
incur any eort-cost uncertainty. Intuitively, because each agent dislikes the eort-cost uncertainty
at the rst order due to loss aversion, the principal needs to compensate for the expected losses
to make the agent accept the contract. This never happens in the concave-utility case where the
principal species dierent eort levels whenever productivity levels are dierent. If  is large, the
benet of alleviating expected losses by specifying the same eort levels exceeds that of improving
productivity by specifying dierent eort levels. Lemma 1 (ii) states that if the principal chooses
a state-dependent task-assignment scheme, then the eort levels are lower than those in the loss-
neutral case. In this scheme, each agent works in one state but not in the other state. This
uncertainty of the task assignment generates expected losses in the eort-cost dimension for which
the principal must compensate. Therefore, the principal has an incentive to reduce the amount of
eort in state 1 in order to decrease expected losses.
We next analyze the optimal contract for loss-averse agents. By substituting the optimal eort
levels into the principal's prot function, we have
(w12; e
; f1; 2g) =
(
q
21
2[1+(1 q)( 1)] + (1  q)
22
2[1 q( 1)] if  < ;
[q1+(1 q)2]2
2 if   ;
(w1; e
; f1g) = q 
2
1
2[1 + (1  q)(  1)] + (1  q)
1
2[1 + q(  1)] :
Comparing these prots, we obtain our main proposition:
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Proposition 1. Suppose agents are loss averse.
(i) If  < , then the contract with the state-independent task assignment C(w12; e; f1; 2g) is
optimal if and only if
22
1 q( 1)  11+q( 1) . Otherwise, the state-dependent contract C(w1; e; f1g)
is optimal.
(ii) If   , then the state-independent contract C(w12; e; f1; 2g) is optimal if and only if
[q1 + (1   q)2]2  q 
2
1
1+(1 q)( 1) + (1   q) 11+q( 1) . Otherwise, the state-dependent contract
C(w1; e; f1g) is optimal.
In contrast to Result 1, a state-independent task assignment can be optimal: the principal
may assign the task to a single agent in all states. Intuitively, under agent loss aversion the
trade-o between improving productivity and alleviating expected losses arises, and therefore the
state-independent assignment is optimal if the latter eect outweighs the former. In addition, as
described in Lemma 1, when the degree of loss aversion is large, the optimal contract becomes state-
independent in the sense that it species the same eort levels across states.9 As a comparative
statics result, the state-independent contract is more likely to be adopted as  increases because
such a contract alleviates the agents' expected losses.
Note that the result of state-independent task assignments (i.e., always employing the same
agent) is derived from two assumptions: that each agent has expectation-based loss aversion and
that each agent's eort cost is strictly increasing in each state. On the other hand, the result of
state-independent contracts (i.e., specifying the same eort level across states) relies on these two as-
sumptions and an additional assumption that each agent's eort-cost function is state-independent.
The principal may not specify the same eort level across states if the eort cost depends on the
state. Even in this case, however, the principal would assign the task to a single agent in both
states.
4 Concluding Remarks
We investigate a task-assignment problem under agent loss aversion and uncertain future states.
We show that state-independent task assignments become optimal when the positive eect of
alleviating expected losses outweighs the negative eect of reducing productivity. We also nd that
9Note that our result is qualitatively dierent from that led by cost complementarity for assignments. Although
cost complementarity could explain why the principal assigns a task to a single agent across states, we predict that
the principal species the same eort levels across states when a single agent works on the task but not when dierent
agents do.
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the optimal state-independent contract species the same eort levels across states when the degree
of loss aversion is large and the agents' eort-cost function is state-independent. This may help
explain, for example, why xed working-hour contracts are so popular even when employers can
adjust the working hours of their employees contingent on situations. Our results could be also
applicable to relevant issues on labor contracts, such as task specialization versus multitasking,
uneven workload, work sharing, and over-time premium.
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